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In times of social upheaval, lawyers can mark the way toward 
social change. In particular, when lawyers become more aggressive 
than traditional lawyers in the cause of fighting injustice, they face 
backlash from multiple sources, including government and their 
own profession. Such was the case during the U.S. civil rights 
movement. Unusually aggressive behavior by cause lawyers was 
met with hostility from their own profession and from government 
action. Those lawyers, while battered at times with physical 
violence, bar ethics charges, contempt of court, and state hostility, 
survived and changed social conditions at the same time they 
altered the culture of their own profession. Some have blamed them 
for the so-called civility crisis in the legal profession. A phenomenon 
with some, but not perfect parallels is happening in China. Activist 
human rights and criminal defense lawyers have undertaken 
tactics that are dramatically outside norms of behavior for Chinese 
lawyers and arguably in violation of law. In general, they face even 
harsher retribution than American civil rights lawyers did, 
although the small number of American lawyers who faced violence 
and near-death in racially-motivated violence could have faced no 
harsher retaliation. The parallels, while far from completely 
matching the two circumstances, are worth exploring and 
considering as the world watches developments in the Chinese 
justice system. 
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I. Introduction 
A new breed of lawyer is practicing criminal defense in China.1 
Dubbed the “die-hard lawyer” by the press, but sometimes 
self-eschewing the label, these new lawyers say they are simply 
representing their clients zealously, advancing their interests by 
whatever legitimate means are at hand.2 What is being said of 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Alex Olesen, Meet China’s Swaggering, ‘Diehard’ Criminal Lawyers, 
FOREIGN POLICY (May 16, 2014), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/16/meet-
chinas-swaggering-diehard-criminal-lawyers/ (explaining that a new group of 
lawyers has developed in China over the last few years) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 2. See id. (remarking on the new “diehard lawyers faction” in China and 
what these lawyers believe). 
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them in the press?3 What do they say about themselves?4 How do 
they compare with the American civil rights era cause lawyer?5 
Both groups of lawyers have been derided by the traditional 
elements of their professions; members of both groups were 
occasionally incarcerated by the government; both groups used 
previously unused, aggressive methods to challenge the status 
quo.6 The aggressive lawyering of the civil rights era cause lawyer 
eventually became one of several accepted ways of lawyering in the 
U.S.7 The long-term effects of developments in China remain to be 
seen.8 But there is no question of the stir that has been created by 
the die-hard lawyer.9 Like that of the American civil rights era 
cause lawyer, it is a stir that is being felt at the highest levels of 
government and established power structures.10 
                                                                                                     
 3. See id. (noting that these lawyers are being talked about in the press). 
 4. Interview by Professor James Moliterno with two of the more prominent 
new breed of Chinese lawyers (July 2014).  
 5. See infra Section IV (comparing the Chinese die-hard lawyers with U.S. 
civil rights cause lawyers). 
 6. See Teng Biao, Opinion, Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Under Assault, 
WASH. POST (July 25, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/24/AR2009072402940.html (describing the 
emergence of Chinese human rights lawyers, their motivations, and the 
consequences they face for their insistence on the rule of law) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). See generally VOICES 
OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS: REFLECTIONS FROM THE DEEP SOUTH, 1964–1980 (Kent 
Spriggs ed., 2017) [hereinafter VOICES OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS] (recounting the 
professional development of civil rights lawyers, the various causes they pursued, 
the consequences they faced, as well as the historical context of civil rights 
litigation, in the 1960s).  
 7. See generally ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL 
JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES (rev. ed., 2007) (describing the efforts and impact of legal aid lawyers, a 
“new breed of lawyers,” during the twentieth century). 
 8. See Olesen, supra note 1 (discussing the new phenomenon created by the 
lawyers in China and the uncertain long-term effects). 
 9. See id. (referring to an article in a Communist Party journal that 
complained that die-hard lawyers, “a ‘poisonous cancer’ on society,” were 
“disrupting social order and undermining public safety”).  
 10. See id. (“The Chinese government is clearly worried about the so-called 
diehards’ impact, and is moving to trim it . . . responding with an ‘increasingly 
repressive policy’ that is trying to rein in the legal profession.”). 
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Perhaps it seems exaggerated to compare the torture of 
Chinese human rights lawyers to the hardships of U.S. civil rights 
lawyers. This is a fair point, and to be sure, we do not suggest the 
situations are precisely the same. We mean only to compare two 
core aspects of the two sets of mistreatment that are strikingly 
similar. Both groups of lawyers have “committed” the same core 
offense: They are disrupting deeply-entrenched, well-guarded 
social orders and power structures, and both groups of lawyers are 
engaging in lawyering conduct that disturbs the norms of 
traditional lawyer conduct. In these two ways, ways we suggest are 
significant, the two groups of lawyers have parallel experiences 
and potential impacts. In this article, we will both compare and 
contrast the two sets of lawyers. 
Although the torture, “disappearance,” and risk endured by 
aggressive Chinese lawyers undoubtedly outstrips the day-to-day 
life risks endured by U.S. civil rights lawyers, it bears 
remembering the fervor and passion with which authorities, 
especially but not exclusively in the South, endeavored to protect 
the continued forms of slavery and white supremacy that 
continued to thrive in the 1940s–1970s (and in some ways until the 
present).11 Intent on maintaining a legal system of white 
supremacy, authorities abandoned all sense of humanity when 
dealing with the most audacious and the most successful civil 
rights lawyers.12 While some such lawyers were run off, some were 
physically beaten, and a few were bombing and lynching targets.13 
The ferocity of treatment by authorities was sometimes cloaked in 
the surface civility of a judge’s ruling against an out of state 
lawyer’s pro hac vice motion, and was sometimes as raw as 
attempted murder by local law enforcement and the local citizens 
that the authorities tolerated and with whom they sometimes 
conspired.14 
                                                                                                     
 11. Compare infra Part II (describing the harsh treatment of criminal 
defense and human rights lawyers in China), with infra Part IV (describing the 
treatment of U.S. civil rights lawyers). 
 12. See infra Part IV (describing the treatment of U.S. civil rights lawyers). 
 13. See infra Part IV (describing the unfortunate consequence of being a civil 
rights lawyer). 
 14. See infra Part IV (discussing how the effort against civil rights lawyers 
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When they were charged with a crime, the criminal charge of 
choice against civil rights lawyers was practicing law without a 
license or various forms of professional misconduct such as 
barratry.15 These were lawyers, properly licensed in their home 
states in the North, to be sure, but they were charged with 
practicing without a Mississippi or Louisiana or Georgia law 
license.16 Then, as now, it is common practice for a lawyer to be 
temporarily out of his home state representing a client in a state 
where he lacks a license.17 The common practice in litigation 
settings is to associate with a local lawyer and ask the local court’s 
permission to represent the lawyer’s client pro hac vice.18 Such 
requests are routinely granted, although there is no due process 
right to be heard on such a request and it can be denied without 
any cause.19 These requests are a normal part of interstate 
practice, and are rarely denied except when a local judge has some 
active dispute with the lawyer or the client.20 For civil rights 
                                                                                                     
was typically local). 
 15. See VOICES OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS, supra note 6, at 167–95 (detailing 
the arrests of John C. Brittain, Armand Derfner, and Richard Sobol for practicing 
without a license); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) (Douglas, 
J., concurring) (“Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee 
passed laws following our 1954 decision [in Brown v. Board of Education,] which 
brought within their barratry statutes attorneys paid by an organization such as 
the N.A.A.C.P and representing litigants without charge.”). Virginia later joined 
the ranks of those states by enacting similar laws in 1956. NAACP, 371 U.S. at 
445. 
 16. See VOICES OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS, supra note 6, at 167–95 (explaining 
that these lawyers were in good standing in their home states). 
 17. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 451 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]ppearances by out-of-state counsel have been routine throughout the 
country . . . .”). 
 18. See MODEL RULE ON PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(providing the current procedure for pro hac vice admission). 
 19. See Leis, 439 U.S. at 442 (finding that because the right of an out-of-state 
lawyer to appear pro hac vice is not a “cognizable property interest” protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution does not obligate state courts to 
provide procedural due process to lawyers applying for pro hac vice admission). 
 20. See id. at 451 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The custom is so well recognized 
that . . . there ‘is not the slightest reason to suppose that a qualified lawyer’s pro 
hac vice request will be denied.’” (quoting Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 
F.2d 161, 168 (2d. Cir. 1966))). 
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lawyers, that dispute was their disruption of social order and their 
challenge to entrenched power structures.21 In China, human 
rights lawyers are typically charged with disrupting public order, 
picking quarrels and causing trouble, or inciting state 
subversion.22 In reality, that is also what the U.S. civil rights 
lawyer was being charged with, but there was (and is) no U.S. law 
criminalizing such conduct. But unmistakably, the U.S. civil rights 
lawyer was under attack in the South for disrupting social order 
and causing trouble, and indeed, as in China, for threatening the 
status quo power structure. 
In the U.S., civil rights lawyers were subject to short jail 
terms, some beatings, a rifle in the mouth, car bombings, house 
bombings, and lynch mobs.23 In China, typically pursuant to the 
RSDL (Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location) 
statute,24 detained lawyers are subject to sleep deprivation, food 
deprivation, mental anguish on relatives and friends, denial of 
counsel, mental/emotional torture, and some physical beatings.25 
Many such disappearances ended in forced confessions, broadcast 
on television and reported in the state print media.26 
                                                                                                     
 21. See id. at 450 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In a series of cases brought in 
courts throughout the South, out-of-state lawyers [appearing pro hac 
vice] . . . developed the legal principles which gave rise to the civil rights 
movement.”). 
 22. See Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, China Targeting Rights Lawyers in 
a Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07 
/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rights-lawyers.html (discussing the 
accusations of “subversion and swindles” made by the Communist Party against 
rights lawyers in China) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 23. See infra Part IV (describing violent threats and physical assaults civil 
rights lawyers had to endure). 
 24. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉
讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated 
by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 7, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980, 
amended Mar. 14, 2012), art. 64, P.R.C. LAWS 72–77. 
 25. See SAFEGUARD DEFS., THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF THE DISAPPEARED: 
STORIES FROM INSIDE CHINA’S SYSTEM FOR ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES 49–65 
(Michael Caster, ed., 2017) [hereinafter SAFEGUARD DEFS., THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF THE DISAPPEARED] (describing the treatment under RSDL based on 
the account of Liu Shihui).  
 26. See generally SAFEGUARD DEFS., SCRIPTED AND STAGED: BEHIND THE 
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In both situations, massive state power was brought down on 
lawyers.27 One enormous difference: In the U.S., ultimately but 
often belatedly, federal authority was on side of civil rights 
lawyer.28 Not so in China. 
II. Who or What Is the “Die-Hard” Chinese Lawyer? 
As groundwork for understanding the new breed of more 
aggressive Chinese lawyer, one must first recognize that Chinese 
Lawyers Law (the rough equivalent of laws on advocates in 
European countries or the rules of professional conduct adopted by 
each of the United States, usually by their state supreme courts) 
places State interests above those of clients.29 To be sure, Western 
lawyers must obey laws and balance their duties to clients with 
their positions as “officers of the court.”30 But the understanding 
in China that the State comes first is made explicit by the Chinese 
Lawyers Law: “Practice by lawyers shall be subject to supervision 
of the State, society and the parties concerned.”31 The foundational 
                                                                                                     
SCENES OF CHINA’S FORCED TELEVISED CONFESSIONS (Rachel Tyrell ed., 2018) 
[hereinafter SAFEGUARD DEFS., SCRIPTED AND STAGED] (analyzing forty-five forced 
confessions between 2013 and 2018). 
 27. See infra Section II (comparing the respective government responses to 
lawyer activism in contemporary China and in America during the civil rights 
movement). 
 28. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (holding that the 
activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff are modes of expression and 
association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which Virginia 
may not prohibit under its power to regulate the legal profession as improper 
solicitation of legal business). 
 29. See Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Lüshi Fa (中华人民共和国律师法) 
[Lawyer Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018), P.R.C. Laws, 
2018, art. 3. (“In legal practice, a lawyer shall subject himself to the supervision 
of the State, society and the parties concerned.”). 
 30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A 
lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal 
system and a public citizen are usually harmonious.”). 
 31.  See Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Lüshi Fa (中华人民共和国律师法) 
[Lawyer Law of the People’s Republic of China], (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Jan.1, 2018), P.R.C. Laws, 
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independence of lawyers in the United States is at least implicitly 
prohibited and replaced by a foundation of State supervision. 
III. Some History of Post-Revolutionary Chinese Lawyer 
Regulation 
1949–2012 
In 1949, the newly established People’s Republic of China 
abolished all of the laws under the old Republic of China 
government, under the spirit of “contempt and criticize the 
counterrevolutionary law and regulation of the KMT,32 contempt 
and criticize Euro-American-Japanese capitalist anti-people law 
and regulations.”33 Beginning in 1950, China experimented with a 
new lawyer system, modeled after the Soviet system, which made 
lawyers part of the government employee.34 Under the strong 
ideology of class struggle, criminal defense lawyers were seen as 
defending bad people, which was an abandonment of class 
warfare.35 The initial lawyer system was discontinued during the 
                                                                                                     
2018, art. 3. 
 32. Refers to Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party, which was 
defeated in the revolution. 
 33. Zhang Zhiming (张志铭), Huimou he Zhanwang: Bainian Zhongguo 
Lüshi de Fazhan Guiji (回眸和展望: 百年中国律师的发展轨迹) [Looking Back and 
Forward: Lawyer’s Development in China in the Past Century], Guojia 
Jianchaguan Xueyuan Xuebao (国家检察官学院学报) [Journal of National 
Prosecutors College] (2013 vol. 1); see Zhongyang Guanyu Feichu Guomindang 
Liufaquanshu he Queding Jiefangqu Sifa Yuanze de Zhishi (中央关于废除国民党
《六法全书》和确定解放区司法原则的指示) [The Party Central’s Guidance 
Regarding the Abolishment of KMT’s Six Codes and the Establishment of Judicial 
Principles of the Liberated Area], (Feb. 22, 1949) 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66650/4491574.html# (deriding the 
laws and policies of the KMT and calling for their abolition) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 34. Zhang, supra note 33 (describing the historic development of lawyer 
system in China).  
 35. See id. (describing the public opinion towards lawyers in China in the 
1950s). 
 
THE NEW BREED, “DIE-HARD” CHINESE LAWYER 107 
“anti-rights movement” in 1957, when many lawyers were 
criticized as rightists, and some were sent to labor camps.36 
During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the legal system 
as a whole was abolished when the “authoritarianism of the mass” 
replaced the police-prosecutor-court system.37 During this period, 
philosophically, there was no need for courts, judges, prosecutors, 
and defense lawyers.38 The public was encouraged to take matters 
of loyalty to the Party into their own hands and enforce these 
norms.39 The results included rampant mob confiscation and 
destruction of property belonging to “landlords,” and the meting 
out of punishment for perceived offenses against the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP or Party) in the name of the revolution. 
The Red Guards ruled. Formal justice administration by courts 
and their officers was superfluous. 
The lawyer system was reinstated in 1978 when China ended 
the Cultural Revolution and was on its way toward the Reform and 
Opening Up.40 In April 1979, the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
set up a special team for drafting regulations on lawyers, and in 
July, the Criminal Procedural Law was passed and the lawyer’s 
participation in the legal system was officially established through 
this law.41 In August 1980, the NPC Standing Committee passed 
the Temporary Regulation on Lawyers.42 
The reinstated lawyer system was similar to the one 
established in the 1950s in which lawyers were “legal professionals 
                                                                                                     
 36. See id. (describing the impact of anti-rights movement on lawyers and 
the end of the lawyer system in China). 
 37. See id. (describing the abandonment of the law during the Cultural 
Revolution). 
 38. See id. (explaining the incompatibility of the western lawyer system to 
the revolutionary China). 
 39. See id. (explaining that political ideology was more important than the 
law during the Cultural Revolution). 
 40. See id. (describing the reinstatement of the lawyer system in China). 
 41. See id. (explaining the legislative effort to reinstate the lawyer system in 
China). 
 42. Xiong Qiuhong (熊秋红), Xin Zhongguo Lüshi Zhidu de Fazhan Licheng 
ji Zhanwang (新中国律师制度的发展历程及展望) [Lawyer Development History 
and Expectations of the New China], Zhongguo Faxue (中国法学) [China Legal 
Science] 15 (1999 Vol. 5). 
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of the state.”43 All lawyers worked for the “legal consultancy 
bureau (法律顾问处),” (later called Lawyer Affair’s Bureau (律师事
务所), which is the same word used by private law firms today) 
which was a government-organized nonprofit organization.44 
Starting in 1988, the State Council (essentially the central 
government body) started to experiment with partnership models 
for law firms where the partners no longer worked for the 
government and the law firms were no longer in the government 
budget.45 This activity was one small part of this period’s general 
phenomenon in China of slightly opening the economic system 
while maintaining tight control over political processes.46 In this 
period, the Soviet Union first opened the political process, 
resulting in massive instability, collapse of the Union, its economy, 
and its control over its satellite states in Eastern and Central 
Europe. China followed largely an opposite path from that of the 
Soviet Union. 
These new experiments with private lawyering and 
partnerships were legalized in 1993 when State Council passed the 
Ministry of Justice Plan for Deepening Lawyer Reform (司法部关
于深化律师工作改革的方案).47 NPC Standing Committee passed 
the PRC Lawyer’s Law (中华人民共和国律师法) in May 1996,48 
which defined lawyers as “professionals that provide legal services 
to the society, who have obtained professional license according to 
law” (依法取得执业证书，为社会提供法律服务的执业人员) instead 
of the “legal professional of the state” (国家法律工作者) in the old 
system.49 Lawyers became private practitioners instead of 
government employees.50  
                                                                                                     
 43. See Zhang, supra note 33 (comparing the lawyer system in the 1980s 
with 1950s).  
 44. See id. (describing the public service nature of the lawyer in the 1980s). 
 45. See Xiong, supra at 42 (describing the privatization of lawyers in China). 
 46. See id. (describing the privatization of the legal profession as part of the 
market economy reform). 
 47. See id. (describing the privatization of lawyers in China). 
 48. See id. at 15 (describing the privatization of lawyers in China). 
 49. See id. (describing the privatization of lawyers in China). 
 50. See id. at 16 (describing the privatization of lawyers in China). 
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China’s Legal Reform 2012–2015 
Since Xi Jinping took power as the General Secretary of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 2012, China has undergone 
significant legal reform.51 Revisions in criminal and administrative 
procedural laws seemed to allow lawyers to play a larger role in 
the legal process.52 A range of wrongful criminal convictions were 
overturned, many after decades, and received huge media 
attention as the success of the legal reform.53 Human rights 
lawyers and activists were at first encouraged by these reforms 
and many believed they signaled an opening up to a heightened 
role for lawyers in the justice system.54 
Ironically, given later events, the apparent reforms during the 
early period of President Xi’s term may have emboldened human 
rights lawyers in a way that alarmed the Party.55 This alarm may 
have contributed to the 709 Crackdown.56 
                                                                                                     
 51. See China Focus: China Scores New Achievements in Judicial Protection 
of Human Rights, XINHUA (July 15, 2017, 9:52:28 PM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-07/15/c_136446475.htm (identifying 
different areas of legal reform since 2012) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 52. See id. (detailing new or revised laws that protect lawyers’ right of 
practice and rules criminal defense lawyers may use to exclude illegally obtained 
evidence).  
 53. See id. (indicating that certain judicial reform initiatives aimed at 
quelling the miscarriage of justice led to the overturning of wrongful convictions); 
see also infra Part II.A.2.c (describing some of the wrongful convictions that were 
overturned). 
 54.  See XINHUA, supra note 51 (explaining how human rights lawyers were 
encouraged by the reforms). 
 55. See id. (explaining how the reforms possibly emboldened human rights 
lawyers). 
 56. July 9, 2015 marked a months-long sweep of more than 300 human 
rights lawyers, legal assistants, and activists. China: On “709” Anniversary, Legal 
Crackdown Continues, HUM. RTS. WATCH (JULY 7, 2017 1:54 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/china-709-anniversary-legal-crackdown-
continues (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice).  
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Amendments in Legislation 
1. Criminal Procedure Law 
The Criminal Procedure Law went through extensive revision 
in 2012, aiming to increase the role of trials, judges and lawyers, 
and thus rid the courts’ reputation as rubber stamps for the state.57 
The revision added five articles (articles 54–58) that purport to 
preclude the use of evidence obtained through torture.58 
The new Criminal Procedure Law also encouraged the taking 
of witness testimony in the courtroom for the first time.59 In the 
past, witness testimonies were only presented to the court on paper 
and judges made decisions purely from the paperwork.60 
Cross-examination of witnesses was rare.61 The newly revised 
Article 59 requires that witness testimony must be examined by 
both sides to be admitted.62 Newly added Articles 62 and 63 
contemplated the protection and compensation for witnesses who 
appear in court.63 Newly added Articles 187 and 188 regulated 
what kind of witnesses must testify (in court) and compulsory 
attendance measures for witnesses who do not appear in court 
                                                                                                     
 57. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa de Jueding(全国人民代表大会关于修改《中华人民共
和国刑事诉讼法》的决定) [Decision of the National People’s Congress on the 
Amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 
2013), § 18. 
 58. See id. (describing the various revisions of articles of the Criminal 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China). 
 59. Id. §§ 19–20 and §§ 71–72. 
 60. See generally Zhuohao Wang, Why Chinese Witnesses Do Not Testify at 
Trial in Criminal Proceedings, CHINA MINISTRY OF EDUC.—PROJECT OF HUMAN. 
AND SOC. SCI. (No. 13YJC820073) (2011) (explaining how testimony was originally 
presented). 
 61.  See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa de Jueding, supra note 57 (describing the various 
revisions of articles of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of 
China). 
 62. Id. § 19, art. 59. 
 63. Id. § 20. 
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without adequate excuse.64 Revised Article 192 allowed expert 
witnesses to testify in trials for the first time.65 Starting from early 
2017, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) initiated a national 
campaign to “substantialize criminal trials,” requiring 
participation of defense lawyers and live witnesses in more 
criminal trials.66 Together these revised articles and following 
reforms described a possible conversion from largely paper trials 
to trials dominated by live testimony.67 In practical application, 
despite the vast revisions and some increase in the use of live 
testimony, trials today are still largely based on paper.68 
On paper, the revisions expanded the scope of the defense 
lawyers’ participation throughout the criminal process.69 Article 36 
was changed so that lawyers may “participate” in the investigation 
stage, rather than “assist,” as the old law allowed.70 Lawyers were 
also allowed to participate in the review of death penalty cases 
with the Supreme Court.71 An ambitious reform proposal recently 
                                                                                                     
 64. Id. § 71. 
 65. Id. § 72. 
 66. Sup. People’s Ct., Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin yi 
Shenpan wei Zhongxin de Xingshi Susong Zhidu Gaige de Shishi Yijian (最高人民
法院关于全面推进以审判为中心的刑事诉讼制度改革的实施意见) [Enforcement 
Opinion of the Supreme People’s Court on Carrying out Criminal Procedure 
Reforms Centered on Trials] (Feb. 17, 2017). 
 67. See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text (noting how trial practice 
has changed).  
 68. See generally Zhuohao Wang, supra note 60. 
 69. See Sup. People’s Ct., Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin 
yi Shenpan wei Zhongxin de Xingshi Susong Zhidu Gaige de Shishi Yijian, supra 
note 66 (explaining the work defense lawyers would participate in). 
 70. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa de Jueding (全国人民代表大会关于修改《中华人民共
和国刑事诉讼法》的决定) [Decision of the Nat’l People’s Cong. on the Amend. of 
the Crim. Proc. L. of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), 
at § 8, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/second-amendment-to-
the-criminal-procedure-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 71.  See China’s New Criminal Procedure Law: Death Penalty Procedures, 
HUM. RTS. J. (Apr. 3, 2012), https://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2012/04/chinas-
new-criminal-procedure-law-death_03.html (referring to the amendment to 
Article 240, which requires the Supreme People’s Court to listen to the opinion of 
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promulgated aims to provide professional assistance to every 
criminal defendant,72 although currently less than 30% of 
defendants have a lawyer.73 
2. Administrative Procedure Law 
The 2014 Administrative Procedure Law revision changed the 
case acceptance system of courts from “review system for case 
docket” (立案审查制) to “registration system of case docket” (立案登
记制).74 The revision means that when plaintiffs file cases in a 
court, the court will no longer decide whether to accept the case 
depending on the merits of the case, but the court will accept and 
register all the cases, or will provide a written explanation of why 
the case is not accepted within seven days of filing.75 This change 
                                                                                                     
defense attorney upon his or her request during the death penalty review process) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 72. See Guanyu Kaizhan Xingshi Anjian Lüshi Bianhu Quanfugai Shidian 
Gongzuo de Banfa (最高人民法院 司法部 关于开展刑事案件律师辩护全覆盖试点工
作的办法) [Sup. People’s Ct. & Ministry of Just. Pilot Plan of Universal Coverage 
of Law. Def. in Crim. Cases] (effective Oct. 11, 2017), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-62912.html (detailing defense counsel 
representation reform plans) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 73. CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, DEFENSE LAWYERS TURNED DEFENDANTS: 
ZHANG JIANZHONG AND THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF DEFENSE LAWYERS IN CHINA 
11 (2003) (citing Wang Jin, Are Defense Lawyers Able to Enjoy ‘Special Rights,’ 
BEIJING YOUTH DAILY, May 22, 2001). 
 74. Susan Finder, New Docketing Procedures Come to the Chinese Courts, 
SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. MONITOR (June 18, 2015), 
https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2015/06/18/new-docketing-procedures-
come-to-the-chinese-courts/ (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 75. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiugai 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jueding (全国人民代表大
会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的决定) [Decision of the Nat’l 
People’s Cong. Standing Comm. on the Amend. of the Admin. Proc. L. of the 
People’s Rep. of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015), at § 31, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2014-11/02/content_1884662.htm (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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made it easier for people to file administrative lawsuits. In the 
past, courts were reluctant to review administrative lawsuits 
against the government that they considered too “sensitive.”76 
The 2014 Administrative Procedure Law revision also added a 
clause prohibiting administrative agencies from interfering with 
the courts’ filing of administrative cases and requiring agencies to 
appear in court for lawsuit hearings.77  
In February 2018, the Supreme People’s Court released an 
interpretation document for the Administrative Procedure Law.78 
It removed ten kinds of actions from the jurisdiction of 
administrative courts.79 Among them are claims based on actions 
of public security and state security agencies authorized under the 
Criminal Procedure Law, which include detention under RSDL.80  
                                                                                                     
 76. See For Some Plaintiffs, Courts in China are Getting Better, ECONOMIST 
(Sep. 30, 2017) https://www.economist.com/china/2017/09/30/for-some-plaintiffs-
courts-in-china-are-getting-better (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 77. See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu 
Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jueding (全国人民
代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的决定) [Decision of 
the Nat’l People’s Cong. Standing Comm. on the Amend. of the Admin. Procedure 
L. of the People’s Rep. of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015), at § 3, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2014-11/02/content_1884662.htm (detailing 
the revised procedural requirements) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 78. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法
》的解释) [Interpretation of the Sup. People’s Ct. Concerning the Application of 
the Admin. Proc. L. of the People’s Rep. of China] (promulgated by the Jud. 
Comm. of the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 13, 2017, effective Feb. 8, 2018), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-80342.html (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 79. See id. art. 1. 
 80. See id. 
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Political Commitments 
1. Judicial Independence 
Besides the legislative changes, statements, and regulations 
from the CCP, in other ways the government suggested the 
leadership was committed to increasing the role of lawyers and 
bringing more independence to the courts. 
Starting in 2015, the SPC started to set up circuit courts that 
are separated from local governments and directly report to the 
SPC in Beijing.81 Within two years, the SPC set up six circuit 
courts around the country.82 The President of the Second Circuit 
Court, Hu Yunteng, wrote at the time in Qiu Shi, one of the most 
influential political commentary magazines published by the CCP, 
that setting up the circuit courts was aimed to ensure the 
independence of the judiciary from the influence of local 
authorities.83  
In March 2015, the CCP and State Council jointly issued a 
regulation on the prevention of and penalties for local government 
officials intervening in judiciary activities.84 In November of the 
                                                                                                     
 81. See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Court Reform with Chinese Characteristics, 27 
WASH. INT’L L. J. 242, 263–64 (2017) (discussing the establishment of circuit 
courts as branches of the Supreme People’s Court to hear inter-regional cases).  
 82. Id. at 265. 
 83. See Hu Yunteng (胡云腾), Wei Shenme Yao Sheli Xunhui Fating? (为什
么要设立巡回法庭？) [Why Do We Need to Set Up Circuit Courts?], Qiu Shi [求是
] (June 15, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2015-
06/15/c_1115588377.htm (explaining that the circuit courts were established to 
separate the judicial system from administrative divisions and to guarantee an 
independent, fair, and impartial judiciary) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Carl Minzner, Legal Reform in 
the Xi Jingping Era, 20 ASIA POL. 4, 7 (2015) (“The creation of cross-jurisdictional 
local courts and procuratorates seeks to cut across existing administrative lines 
of authority and curb the influence of local officials.”). 
 84. Guanyu Lingdao Ganbu Ganyu Sifa Huodong Chashou Juti Anjian Chuli 
de Jilu, Tongbao he Zeren Zhuijiu Guiding (关于领导干部干预司法活动插手具体案
件处理的记录、通报和责任追究规定) [Regulation on the Recording, Reporting and 
Accountability Measures for Intervention of Judicial Activities and Meddling of 
Specific Cases by Officials] (promulgated by the General Office of the Communist 
Party of China and General Office of the State Council, effective Mar. 18, 2015) 
http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2015-03/30/content_2840521.htm (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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same year, and again in February 2016, the CCP’s Central Political 
and Legal Affairs Commission published a combination of twelve 
typical examples of prohibited intervention by government officials 
in judicial activities.85 These cases include local government 
officials, judges, prosecutors, and police officers trying to influence 
cases by exercising their public authority.86  
The term “judicial independence” in China only means 
independence from the personal interests of officials or the undue 
influence of local governments.87 It does not mean independence 
from the CCP leadership.88 The ideological control by the CCP is a 
foundational aspect of the justice system; at least in matters of 
interest to the CCP, there is no judicial independence from the 
interests of the CCP.89 In fact, the CCP ideological control has been 
                                                                                                     
 85. See Zhongyang Zhengfawei Tongbao 5 qi Ganyu Sifa, Chashou Anjian 
Chuli Dianxing Anjian (中央政法委通报5起干预司法、插手案件处理典型案件) 
[Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Reports 5 Typical Cases of 
Intervention of Judicial Activities and Meddling of Cases], RENMIN WANG (人民网
) [PEOPLE’S NETWORK] (Nov. 6, 2015 11:17 AM), 
http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2015/1106/c64371-27785727.html [hereinafter 2015 
Cases of Intervention] (providing examples of five government officials 
intervening in judicial activities and specific cases) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Zhongyang Zhengfawei 
Tongbao qi qi Ganyu Sifa Dianxing Anjian (中央政法委通报七起干预司法典型案件 
[Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Reports Seven Typical Cases of 
Intervention of Judicial Activities] RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY] 
(Feb. 2, 2016, 7:30 AM), http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0202/c64371-
28102905.html [hereinafter 2016 Cases of Intervention] (providing seven 
examples of government officials intervening in judicial activities and specific 
cases) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 86. See Cases of Intervention, supra note 85. 
 87. See Judicial Independence in the PRC, CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 
https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-the-prc (last visited Oct. 16, 2018) 
(describing the more limited concept of judicial independence that exists in China 
as compared with that in the West) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 88. See id. (explaining that the leadership of the Party, the people’s 
congresses, and the procuratorate “are generally not considered improper 
restraints on judicial independence”). 
 89. See id. (noting that “judges are expected to adhere to the leadership of 
the Party” and that while “Party interference is less common than local 
government official interference . . . this distinction is clouded in practice, as most 
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growing even stronger, even among legal professionals. At a 
conference with provincial high court presidents in 2017, the SPC’s 
president, Zhou Qiang, explicitly addressed the importance of 
ideological work and categorized the western ideas of 
“constitutional democracy,” “checks and balances,” and “judicial 
independence” as “wrongful thought.”90 Although it caused a huge 
backlash from the public, the SPC did not back down from Zhou 
Qiang’s statement.91 Instead, the SPC published two 
commentaries three days later supporting the statement, further 
explaining why the western legal system is not suitable for China 
and why promoting western ideology is dangerous to the country.92 
Despite technical improvements in independence from local 
                                                                                                     
key government officials are also Party members”). 
 90. Supreme People’s Court (最高人民法院), Zhou Qiang: Zhashi Zuohao 
Renmin Fayuan Gexiang Gongzuo, Yi Youyi Chengji Yingjie Dang de Shijiuda 
Shengli Zhaokai (周强：扎实做好人民法院各项工作，以优异成绩迎接党的十九大胜
利召开) [Zhou Qiang: Solidly Accomplish all the Tasks of the People’s Courts, 
Welcome the Victorious Opening of the Nineteenth Party Congress with Excellent 
Achievements], SINA WEIBO (Jan. 14, 2017, 7:14 PM), 
https://weibo.com/3908755088/EqOiSharJ?type=comment#_rnd1519865052159 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 91. See Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independent 
Judiciary, and Reformers Wince, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/asia/china-chief-justice-courts-zhou-
qiang.html?_ga=2.186358443.369514703.1519864599-175205695.1517193387 
(addressing the frustrations felt in China and abroad with Zhou Qiang’s rejection 
of the Western concept of judicial independence) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 92. See Supreme People’s Court (最高人民法院), Guchui Cuowu Sichao Weiji 
Guojia Zhengzhi Anquan (鼓吹错误思潮危及国家政治安全) [Promoting Wrongful 
Thoughts are Dangerous for the Political Security of the Country], SINA WEIBO 
(Jan. 17, 2017, 11:38 PM) 
https://weibo.com/3908755088/ErijuBj4q?type=comment#_rnd1519866340176 
(providing support for Shou Qiang’s statement) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Supreme People’s Court (最
高人民法院), Dui Cuowu Sichao Liangjian Shi Women de Lishi Shiming (对错误
思潮亮剑是我们的历史使命) [Challenging Wrongful Thoughts is Our Historical 
Mission], SINA WEIBO (Jan. 17, 2017, 11:39 PM), 
https://weibo.com/3908755088/ErijQecNt?type=comment#_rnd1519866312942 
(same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
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authorities, ideological control is not going away in the Chinese 
court system but, instead, is growing even stronger.93  
2. Protecting Lawyers’ Professional Rights 
Even after the 709 Crackdown, in September 2015, the 
Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, 
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and 
Ministry of Justice jointly issued the Regulations on Protecting 
Lawyers’ Professional Rights According to Law.94 Similar to the 
added professional rights for lawyers in the Criminal Procedure 
Law amendment,95 this Regulation is a reiteration of the lawyer’s 
rights and an implementation guide for the agencies.96 Although 
the Regulation shows the commitment to protect the lawyers’ 
rights, violations are still common.97  
                                                                                                     
 93. See Forsythe, supra note 91, (describing President Xi Jingping’s demand 
for obedience from the judiciary). 
 94. See Guanyu Yifa Baozhang Lüshi Zhiye Quanli de Guiding (关于依法保
障律师执业权利的规定) [Regulations on Protecting Lawyers’ Professional Rights 
According to Law] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., the People’s 
Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of St. Security, and Ministry 
of Just., effective Sept. 16, 2015) http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-
09/20/c_1116616593.htm (outlining the rights of Chinese lawyers) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 95. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa de Jueding (全国人民代表大会关于修改《中华人民共
和国刑事诉讼法》的决定) [Decision of the National People’s Congress on the 
Amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/lfzt/xsssfxg/2012-03/15/content_1717671.htm (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 96. Guanyu Yifa Baozhang Lüshi Zhiye Quanli de Guiding (关于依法保障律
师执业权利的规定) [Regulations on Protecting Lawyers’ Professional Rights 
According to Law] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., the Sup. People’s 
Procuratorate, Ministry of Pub. Security, Ministry of St. Security, and Ministry 
of Just., effective Sept. 16, 2015) http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-
09/20/c_1116616593.htm (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 97. See China: Release Human Rights Lawyers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 15, 
2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/15/china-release-human-
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Several of the lawyers defending the “709 lawyers,” for 
example, were shown a boilerplate Decision to Reject the Lawyer’s 
Request to Meet with the Criminal Suspect.98 Article 9 of the 
Regulation says that if law enforcement determines that, in cases 
involving state security, terrorist activity, or significant bribery, 
allowing a lawyer to meet with the suspect might impair the 
investigation or leak state secrets, law enforcement may deny the 
meeting and provide an explanation to the lawyer.99 These 
                                                                                                     
rights-lawyers (detailing the many ways the Chinese government has wrongfully 
punished Chinese lawyers) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 98. See Liu Sixin, Zhao Wei Shexian Shandian Buyu Lüshi Huijian ji 
Biangeng Qiangzhi Cuoshi (刘四新、赵威涉嫌煽颠不予律师会见及变更强制措施) 
[Liu Sixin and Zhao Wei Suspected for Inciting Subversion, Not Allowed to Meet 
Lawyer or Change Custodian Measures], CHINA FREE PRESS (Sept. 22, 2015), 
http://www.canyu.org/n103083c12.aspx [hereinafter Liu Sixin and Zhao Wei 
Suspected] (showing letters from the Tianjin Public Security rejecting for state 
security reasons the request of lawyers for Zhao Wei and Liu Sixin to meet with 
their clients) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); see also Wang Yu Lüshi She Shandong Dianfu Guojia Zhengquan Zaici 
Buzhun Lüshi Huijian (王宇律师涉煽动颠覆国家政权再次不准律师会见) [Lawyer 
Wang Yu Suspected for Inciting Subversion of State Regime, Not Allowed to Meet 
Lawyer Again], BOXUN (博讯) (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://boxun.com/news/gb/china/2015/09/201509302135.shtml#.Vre_BDYrLNA 
[hereinafter Wang Yu Suspected] (showing a letter from Tianjin Public Security 
rejecting for state security reasons the request of Wang Yu’s lawyers to meet with 
their client) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); Zhang Kai Buzhun Jian Lüshi, Wenzhou Jingfang Fa Shumian Tongzhi 
(张凯不准见律师 温州警方发书面通知) [Zhang Kai Not Allowed to Meet Lawyer, 
Wenzhou Police Issued Written Notice], RADIO FREE ASIA (自由亚洲电台) (Sept. 8, 
2015), https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/renquanfazhi/ql1-
09082015123133.html [hereinafter Zhang Kai Not Allowed to Meet Lawyer] 
(showing letter from Wenzhou Public Security rejecting for state security reasons 
the request of Zhang Kai’s lawyer to meet with his client) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 99. Guanyu Yifa Baozhang Lüshi Zhiye Quanli de Guiding (关于依法保障律
师执业权利的规定) [Regulations on Protecting Lawyers’ Professional Rights 
According to Law], (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, 
and Ministry of Justice, Sept. 16, 2015, effective Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-09/20/c_1116616593.htm (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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boilerplate rejection forms do not provide any explanation but 
simply say that the case is related to state security.100 They plainly 
violate the requirement of the Regulation101 Professor Jerome 
Cohen observed that one of the rejection notices is numbered 1082, 
which he interprets to mean that the notice is the 1,082nd rejection 
of the year issued by the Public Security Bureau.102 Even if 
Professor Cohen’s interpretation is incorrect and it was not the 
1,082nd rejection, rejecting a lawyer’s attempt to meet with a client 
is prevalent, and not just in state security cases.103 
3. Overturning of Wrongful Convictions 
To showcase the country’s determination and success in legal 
reform, Chinese media highly publicized the overturning of several 
wrongful convictions.  
In the case of Nian Bin, for example, Nian Bin was sentenced 
to death for poisoning his neighbors.104 SPC rejected the death 
penalty because of insufficient evidence.105 Nian Bin was sentenced 
to death again, and the death penalty was rejected three more 
                                                                                                     
 100. Liu Sixin and Zhao Wei Suspected, supra note 98; Wang Yu Suspected, 
supra note 98; Zhang Kai Not Allowed to Meet Lawyer, supra note 98. 
 101. See Guanyu Yifa Baozhang Lüshi Zhiye Quanli de Guiding (关于依法保
障律师执业权利的规定) [Regulations on Protecting Lawyers’ Professional Rights 
According to Law] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., the Sup. People’s 
Procuratorate, Ministry of Pub. Security, Ministry of St. Security, and Ministry 
of Justice, Sept. 16, 2015, effective Sept. 16, 2015) 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2015-09/20/c_1116616593.htm (explaining the 
rights lawyers have to engage with criminal suspects) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 102. Posting of Jerome Cohen, jacohen@paulweiss.com, to 
CHINALAW@hermes.gwu.edu (Feb. 7, 2016) (on file with author). 
 103. See id. 
 104. Zhang Debi (张德笔), Nianbin Xiyuan Lu: Sici Pansi, Zhongyu Wuzui (念
斌洗冤录：四次判死，终于无罪) [Story of Nian Bin’s Regaining of Innocence: Four 
Times Sentenced to Death, Eventually Acquitted], TENCENT REV. (腾讯评论) (Aug. 
23, 2014), http://view.news.qq.com/original/intouchtoday/n2894.html (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 105. Id. 
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times.106 The expert witness in this last trial finally found the 
evidence that fully exonerated Nian Bin.107 Police evidence showed 
poison in the water, but the expert witness’s tests found no poison 
on the teapot.108 Nian Bin was acquitted after eight years on death 
row.109 Nian Bin’s lawyer, Zhang Yansheng, said that the 
introduction of the expert witness was crucial in proving Nian 
Bin’s innocence.110  
In another case, Chen Man was arrested in 1992 for murder 
and was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve in 1994.111 He 
missed the appeal deadline, but the Procuratorate thought the 
sentence was too light and appealed for a death sentence without 
reprieve.112 The Hainan provincial high court upheld the 
suspended death sentence in 1999.113 Chen Man’s family and 
lawyers continued to appeal and petition to the Hainan high court 
and Supreme People’s Procuratorate.114 In 2014, a number of high 
profile lawyers (some of them may be categorized as die-hard 
lawyers) had a meeting to discuss Chen Man’s case and a journalist 
in attendance later published the story.115 In 2015, the Supreme 
                                                                                                     
 106. Id. 
 107. Li Yunfang (李云芳), Duihua Nianbin Lüshi Zhangyansheng: Yao 
Biaoyang Faguan, Guli Tamen Jiuzheng Yuan’an (对话念斌律师张燕生：要表扬法
官，鼓励他们纠正冤案) [Conversation with Nianbin’s Lawyer Zhang Yansheng: 
We should complement the judges and encourage them to fix wrongful convictions], 
PENGPAI XINWEN (澎湃新闻) (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1263125 (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Wang Jianfa (王健), “Guonei Yizhi Beiguan Zuijiu de Yuanyu Fan” Chen 
Man 23 Nian Hou Xuangao Wuzui (“国内已知被关最久的冤狱犯”陈满23年后宣
告无罪) [“The Longest Known Innocent Convict in the Nation” Chen Man 
Pronounced Not Guilty After 23 Years], PENGPAI XINWEN (澎湃新闻) (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1427938 (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Yi Yanyou (易延友), Chen Man An Shen Yuan Ji (陈满案申冤记) 
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People’s Procuratorate took the case and petitioned to the Supreme 
People’s Court.116 The case was retried in Zhejiang provincial high 
court in 2016 and Chen Man was acquitted because the only 
incriminating evidence was his own testimony and his testimony 
was self-conflicting.117 Although Chen Man also told his lawyer 
that he was tortured in 1992, the torture claim was not addressed 
in the case.118  
Two other subjects of highly publicized wrongful conviction 
cases were not so lucky: Huge Jiletu and Nie Shubin, who 
posthumously got their convictions overturned, were executed in 
the 1990s before adoption of the requirement that the SPC had to 
consider, review, and approve all death penalties.119  
                                                                                                     
[Story of the Petition for Chen Man Case], XIYUANWANG (洗冤网) (Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://www.xiyuanwang.net/html/cma_1298_1931.html (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Liu Jing (刘
旌), Wei Juzhen (魏居娴) & Li Runyang(李润阳), Hainan Yi’an: “Chuanshuo Zhong 
de Wuzheng” Rang Beigaoren Fuxing le 21 Nian (海南疑案：“传说中的物证”让
被告人服刑了21年) [Hainan Mysterious Case: “Mythical Evidence” Made 
Defendant Serving 21 Years in Prison], PENGPAI XINWEN (澎湃新闻) (July 25, 
2014), http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1257855 (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 116. Yi Yanyou (易延友), Chen Man An Shen Yuan Ji (陈满案申冤记) [Story of 
the Petition for Chen Man Case], XIYUANWANG (洗冤网), Feb. 24, 2015, 
http://www.xiyuanwang.net/html/cma_1298_1931.html (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 117. See High People’s Court of Zhejiang Province, Zhejiang Gaoyuan jiu 
Chenman An Zaishen Wuzui Da Jizhe Wen (浙江高院就陈满案再审无罪答记者问) 
[Zhejiang High Court Answers Questions from Journalists on Retrial and 
Acquittal of Chen Man Case], SINA WEIBO (新浪微博) (Feb. 1, 2016, 10:13 AM), 
https://weibo.com/p/1001603937651697836422 (explaining that apart from Chen 
Man’s guilty confession, which was deemed “unstable” and “inconsistent,” there 
was no other evidence to prove that Chen Man committed the crime) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 118. See Wang Jianfa (王健), “Guonei Yizhi Beiguan Zuijiu de Yuanyu Fan” 
Chen Man 23 Nian Hou Xuangao Wuzui (“国内已知被关最久的冤狱犯”陈满23年
后宣告无罪) [“The Longest Known Innocent Convict in the Nation” Chen Man 
Pronounced Not Guilty After 23 Years], PENGPAI XINWEN (澎湃新闻) (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1427938 (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 119. Wang Xiaoyu (王筱渔), Huge Jiletu An Shimo: Bei Qiangbi 9 Nian Hou 
Ling Yi Nanzi Gongshu Sharen Jingguo (呼格吉勒图案始末：被枪毙9年后另一男
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In the latest SPC report during the NPC session in March 
2018, the SPC had overturned 39 wrongful convictions, involving 
78 people in the last five years.120  
Undoubtedly, all of the reform from 2012–2015 contributed to 
the bold actions of criminal defense and human rights lawyers, all 
to be dashed by the 709 Crackdown and subsequent repression. 
IV. The Die-Hard Model 
The “die-hard” lawyer model, though not the moniker, may 
have started at least as early as 2007 or 2008, but perhaps in truth 
as early as Tiananmen Square, when some of today’s die-hard 
lawyers were cutting their social-consciousness teeth as student 
demonstrators.121 Although the die-hard moniker has only been 
applied to criminal defense lawyers, they are surely the close 
relative of the slightly earlier-appearing group of Chinese lawyers 
taking up social causes in the public interest, such as 
representation of families of victims of the toxic baby formula 
                                                                                                     
子供述杀人经过) [Beginning and End of the Huge Jiletu Case: Another Man 
Confesses the Killing 9 Years after Execution], FENGHUANG JUJIAO (凤凰聚焦) (Nov. 
12, 2014), http://news.ifeng.com/a/20141112/42452914_0.shtml (discussing Huge 
Jiletu’s case) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); Mengyuan 21 Nian, Nie Shubin Zaishen Zhonghuo Wuzui (蒙冤21年，聂
树斌案再审终获无罪) [Wronged for 21 years, Nie Shubin’s Retrial Finally Granted 
Innocence], CAIXIN (财新) (Dec. 2, 2016), http://china.caixin.com/2016-12-
02/101021724.html (discussing Nie Shubin’s case) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 120. Chinese Courts Redress 39 Wrongful Conviction Cases in Past 5 Years, 
XINHUA (Feb. 5, 2018, 9:41:11 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
02/05/c_136951210.htm (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice); Zhou Qiang (周强), President, Sup. People’s Ct., Work 
Report to the Thirteenth National People’s Congress: Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 
Gongzuo Baogao (最高人民法院工作报告) [Supreme People’s Court Work Report] 
(Mar. 9, 2018). 
 121. See Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers 
and Implications for U.S.-China Relations: Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. 
Comm’n on China, 115th Cong. 7–8 (2017) [hereinafter Gagging the Lawyers] 
(noting that some die-hard lawyers gained their courage from participation in the 
1989 Tiananmen movement). 
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produced by Sanlu Milk Co. in 2008.122 Criminal defense matters, 
sometimes on behalf of organized crime suspects,123 may appear 
unlike the cases against a politically well-connected milk company 
or cases undertaken by American civil rights lawyers who did 
criminal representation of protestors and activists, school 
desegregation, voting rights and all manner of politically-charged 
cases. But in China, all high-profile criminal prosecutions are 
political.124 The affront implicit in challenging the State’s will, even 
in an otherwise non-politically-charged criminal matter, is a far 
different phenomenon than an American lawyer fighting hard for 
her routine criminal defendant client.  
In late December 2012, days before the new Chinese Criminal 
Procedure Law took effect, the Criminal Committee of the Zhejiang 
Provincial Bar Association issued a series of guidelines titled “Ten 
Risks of Criminal Defense and Their Solutions.”125 One guideline 
reads: “When disagreeing with the judge during a trial, a lawyer 
shall state his/her opinions (for the record) and then follow the 
presiding judge’s order and avoid direct confrontation. When the 
                                                                                                     
 122. See Teng Biao, Opinion, Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Under Assault, 
WASH. POST (July 25, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/24/AR2009072402940.html (discussing the work of a 
few dozen Chinese “rights lawyers” who, by 2009, experienced “success in 
protecting the rights of individuals and in . . . [raising] awareness of the law 
among people all across China”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 123. See Olesen, supra note 1 (discussing the representation of a person 
accused of gang-related crimes in China by a team of so-called “diehard” lawyers). 
 124. See Jayshree Bajoria, Access to Justice in China, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 
2008, 10:14 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/04/17/AR2008041701692.html (noting the direct 
correlation between increased media coverage of a criminal prosecution and the 
politicization of the case, which “reinforces [Party oversight over the courts” in 
order to obtain “a judgment that quiets popular sentiment”) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 125. Su Hucheng (苏湖城), Lüshi Congshi Xingshi Bianhu Yewu Shida 
Fengxiandian ji Caozuo Tishi (律师从事刑事辩护业务十大风险点及操作提示) [Ten 
Risks of Lawyers Practicing Criminal Defense and Practicing Tips], Hualu (华律) 
[HUALV.COM] (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.66law.cn/domainblog/39964.aspx 
(providing a list of practice tips in anticipation of the implementation of 
amendments to criminal defense provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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court violates procedural rules, a lawyer shall file his/her 
complaints in writing after the trial.”126 On its surface, this 
admonition sounds little different from the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rule instructing lawyers to obey even 
erroneous orders of judges.127 But the cultural and systemic 
differences between China and the United States make the 
instructions quite different.  
Obviously the Zhejiang Bar Association guidelines are trying 
to protect defense lawyers from risky practice.128 However, after 
the guidelines were posted online, surprisingly serious attacks 
came from other members of the defense bar—members of the new 
breed of co-called “die-hard” criminal defense lawyers. One defense 
lawyer, who often takes hard lines against the court, mocked the 
proposed guideline that defense lawyers should “defend[] clients 
with bended knees, instead of straight legs.” This group of die-hard 
lawyers repeatedly quoted the famous saying: “[T]he only thing 
necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing!” In 
other words, avoiding confrontation with a corrupt judge is nothing 
but encouraging that judge to do more evil. When facing a corrupt 
judge, in contrast, these die-hard lawyers not only lodge objections 
at court, but also resort to live social media activity, disciplinary 
complaints and street demonstrations to challenge the court.129 
Two lawyers even handed a bag of sweet potatoes to the president 
of a high court, suggesting that if the president does not protect 
the people, he should go home and sell sweet potatoes (a traditional 
Chinese saying).130 
                                                                                                     
 126. Id. 
 127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.4(c), 3.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(“A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a 
tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists”; “A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.”). 
 128. See Su Hucheng, supra note 125 (providing a list of ten risks associated 
with criminal defense practice). 
 129. See Gagging the Lawyers, supra note 121, at 7 (“So-called diehard 
lawyers actively used the social media and street theater to activate supporters 
and expose problems in defending their clients.”). 
 130. Li Meng (李蒙), Sike shi Yizhong Paibie Haishi Yizhong Fangfa? (死磕是
一种派别还是一种方法) [Is Sike a Faction or a Method?], MINZHU YU FAZHI (民主与
法制) [DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF L.] Vol. 17, 2014. 
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V. New Methods Used by the Die-Hard Lawyer 
In one sense, die-hard lawyers are simply more intense than 
their traditional Chinese counterparts. A traditional Chinese 
defense lawyer manages the defense-side evidence and makes 
technical legal arguments.131 A somewhat more aggressive form of 
traditional lawyer deeply and intensely analyzes the civil law 
articles and makes incisive arguments about their application to 
the defendant. But both traditional defense lawyers and their 
slightly more probing, technical compatriots yield when it becomes 
clear that the judge cannot or will not accept their arguments, 
sometimes with the tacit understanding that the judge is being 
controlled by forces outside the courtroom.132 
The die-hard lawyer is certainly more aggressive in the first 
instance. He or she does all that the technically-oriented 
traditional lawyer does, but also vigorously pursues arguments 
about the legality of the prosecution’s evidence and methods. The 
die-hard lawyer challenges judges’ rulings on evidence admission 
and procedural rights and does so vociferously.133 And the die-hard 
lawyer does so even after it is clear that the judge will not be 
permitted by others to rule in the defense’s favor.134 But in addition 
to being more aggressive and more persistent, the die-hard lawyer 
                                                                                                     
 131. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉
讼法) [Crim. Proc. L. of the People’s Republic of China], (promulgated by Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 7, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980, amended Mar. 
14, 2012), ch. IV, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/criminal-
procedure-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china#body-chinese (describing the 
rights of a criminal suspect to representation and the role of a criminal defense 
lawyer) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 132. See CECC, Judicial Independence in the PRC, 
https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-the-prc (last visited Nov. 28, 2018) 
(“China’s judiciary continues to be subject to a variety of internal and external 
controls that significantly limit its ability to engage in independent decision 
making.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 133. See Ye Zhusheng (叶竹盛), Sike Pai Lüshi (死磕派律师) [Die-hard sect], 
RENMIN WENZHAI (人民文摘) [PEOPLE’S DIGEST] (describing lawyer Chi Yusheng’s 
fierce and emotional protest against the presiding judge for interfering with the 
illegal evidence exemption procedure in the Li Qinghong case). 
 134.  See id. (discussing the various pressures affecting judicial decisions). 
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uses tactics that are outside the walls of the courtroom and its 
procedures.135 
In particular, the die-hard lawyer uses social media as a tool 
of advocacy.136 During the Li Qinghong trial, an “all-star team” of 
defense lawyers blanketed the Chinese social media with news of 
the proceedings, commenting on everything from errors in the 
indictments to the disparate volume of the defense and prosecution 
microphones.137 The media work was so intense that Weibo—a 
Chinese version of Facebook and Twitter—updates were being sent 
live from the courtroom by defense lawyers, and large segments of 
the population were riveted to the news. 
[L]awyers’ online activities can be traced back to the influential 
case of Li Zhuang, a lawyer falsely prosecuted with perjury in 
Chongqing, in 2010. While the voices of the official media 
framing and blaming Li were dominating public opinion, the 
defense had no choice but to tell the other side of the story via 
social media.138 
Such use of media to offset public information that cuts 
against a defendant may cause some to think of Model Rule 3.6139 
and Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,140 the Supreme Court case that 
trimmed the rough edges from the earlier version of the Model Rule 
and established the propriety of self-defense use of public 
                                                                                                     
 135. See Gagging the Lawyers, supra note 121, at 7 (“So-called diehard 
lawyers actively used the social media and street theater to activate supporters 
and expose problems in defending their clients.”) 
 136. See id. (“Through social media, activist lawyers could create instant 
crowds to rush to a courthouse or defend a lawyer being harassed by police.”) 
 137. Zhang Xueran, China’s All Star Legal Team Pleas for Defendants’ Right 
on Social Media, TEA LEAF NATION (July 25, 2012).  
 138. Id.  
 139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) 
(providing restraints on a lawyer’s ability to make extrajudicial statements 
regarding an investigation or litigation in which he or she is participating or has 
participated). 
 140. See Gentile v. Nev. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991) (finding a 
Nevada Supreme Court Rule prohibiting a lawyer from making extrajudicial 
statements to the press he knows or reasonably should know will have a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding, but 
allowing him to state without elaboration the general nature of the defense, is 
void for vagueness). 
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statements, especially those meant to counter negative media 
reports about the defendant.141 But that quick leap would be 
mistaken. The U.S. law on the subject is an effort to balance free 
speech with fair trial, and specifically to protect the jury pool from 
undue factual contamination regarding celebrated cases, while 
respecting free speech rights of lawyers and media.142 By contrast, 
the Chinese use of this balancing concept has nothing to do with 
non-existent jury pools and ensuring an impartial lay fact-finder. 
Instead, the Chinese use of social media by defense lawyers is an 
effort to combat raw power of those in control of the justice system, 
both judges and so-called “higher-ups,” CCP officials who can 
control judges’ decisions.143 
This use of social media, designed to create public pressure 
and possible embarrassment of “higher ups” seems odd to some 
Americans, simply because such a technique would be so unlikely 
of success in influencing a U.S. judge. Ironically, it is the lack of 
judicial independence in China that makes the technique viable. 
                                                                                                     
 141. See id. at 1056 (noting that rules restricting speech of criminal defense 
attorneys must be scrutinized when, in comparison, “[t]he police, the prosecution, 
other government officials, and the community at large hold innumerable 
avenues for the dissemination of information adverse to a criminal defendant”). 
 142. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“It 
is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and 
safeguarding the right of free expression.”). 
Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment 
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trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved . . . . On the other 
hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination 
of information about events having legal consequences and about legal 
proceedings themselves. 
Id. 
 143. See Oleson, supra note 1 (noting die-hard lawyers’ extensive use of social 
media to advocate for their clients and their combative posture towards corrupt 
Party officials, the police and judges who have abused their power); see also 
Nathan Vanderklippe, Thwarted by China’s Courts, ‘Diehard’ Lawyers ‘Fight to 
the Death’ for Justice, GLOBE AND MAIL (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/thwarted-by-chinas-courts-
diehard-lawyers-fight-to-the-death-for-justice/article34830997/ (noting the 
influence of local authorities on courtroom decisions, which leaves judges in China 
with “very little independent authority”) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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The well-founded expectation of Chinese criminal defense lawyers 
in high profile cases is that judges are told what to do by people 
often referred to as “higher ups.”144 These higher ups are party 
officials whose will is being done by local judges and prosecutors.145 
Such orders from government officials were referred to as 
“telephone justice” in Central and Eastern Europe during 
communist times.146 Such orders, while not entirely unheard-of in 
an independent court system, are both rare and, we would expect, 
ineffectual. In such an independent court system, nothing much 
would be gained in an individual case by generating public opinion. 
But the taste of the Chinese public seems to have been whetted for 
news of injustice, and the “higher ups,” while they wield mostly 
unchecked power, do care about stirring the public ire.147 This is 
just the trend and tendency that is being banked on by the die-hard 
lawyer in the use of social media.148 The same phenomenon allows, 
but does not ensure, that they will stay out of jail themselves. 
These methods are far outside the norm for Chinese 
lawyers.149 The methods themselves are used to advance both 
client interests and to expose flaws in the Chinese criminal justice 
system.150 Both the use of the methods and the goal of advancing a 
                                                                                                     
 144. See Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the 
Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 67 (2005) (“Higher-level officials 
exert pressure on individual judges and courts . . . .”). 
 145. See id. (discussing higher-up officials who put pressure on judges and 
courts to influence the outcome of a case). 
 146. See Volha Kananovich, ‘Execute Not Pardon’: The Pussy Riot Case, 
Political Speech, and Blasphemy in Russian Law, 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 311, 395 
(discussing the practice of “telephone law” in Russia in which “outcomes of cases 
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 147. See Vanderklippe, supra note 143 (discussing a two-year campaign of the 
Chinese government to arrest, detain, and intimidate die-hard lawyers as a way 
of keeping them out of the media). 
 148. See id. (“[S]ome Chinese lawyers have turned to other means to defend 
their clients, leveraging the power of social media and the occasional willingness 
of political authorities to bend to public pressure.”). 
 149. See id. (“Such tactics have been controversial, and diehard lawyers have 
been denounced in state media as ‘commandos’ and ‘activists’ who . . . have wild 
intentions to challenge and change the law . . . .”). 
 150. See id. (“‘But I’m very sympathetic to why [die-hard lawyers] did it. It’s 
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lawyer’s cause have drawn harsh rebuke from the Chinese legal 
profession and from the state.151 
The current term, die-hard lawyer appears to have originated 
in connection with a high-profile criminal defense in 2012.152 
[T]he term originated from a discussion . . . in Guiyang, the 
capital of Southern China’s Guizhou province, in July 2012. 
Yang [Xuelin, who identifies himself as a diehard lawyer on his 
Weibo page] and a colleague named Chi Susheng were part of a 
team of lawyers from around China who had come to the city to 
defend a former property tycoon accused of gang-related crimes. 
Over lunch on the first day of the trial, Chi complained the trial 
was already not going well. It was riddled with procedural 
problems, she said, and the team was going to have to “firmly 
fight to the bitter end,” using the northern slang term sike—
which roughly means to fight to the bitter end, or to die hard.153 
The name stuck and has become a sensitive topic in China.154  
What identifies a die-hard lawyer? 
If there were a checklist for China’s “diehard lawyers faction” it 
would probably read something like this: Must be combative, 
dramatic, and have a flair for social media; must not be 
intimidated by authority; and must be willing to spend time 
under house arrest or in jail.155 
It sounds like some U.S. civil rights cause lawyers, such as Bill 
Kunstler, for example, would qualify.156 
                                                                                                     
precisely because they couldn’t find justice in the courtroom.’”). 
 151. See id. (discussing a campaign by the Chinese government to intimidate 
and jail die-hard lawyers and the denouncement of die-hard lawyers by the 
Chinese media). 
 152. See Olesen, supra note 1 (“Beijing lawyer Yang Xuelin, who identifies 
himself . . . as a “diehard,” told Communist Party mouthpiece newspaper People’s 
Daily that the term originated from a discussion with [fellow lawyer Chi 
Susheng] . . . in July 2012.”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Vanderklippe, supra note 143 (“The term, and the methods it evokes, 
have become dangerous in a country that has actively targeted lawyers.”). 
 155. Olesen, supra note 1. 
 156. See infra Part IV (describing the career of civil rights lawyer William 
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Yang Jianlin wrote that the prerequisites of sike include: 1) 
the prosecution obviously broke the law, 2) the client had already 
decided to sike and requested the lawyer to sike, and 3) there were 
no other legal remedy besides sike.157 The sike methods, Yang 
summarized, include: 1) strictly adhering to the text of the law, 2) 
the use of social media, 3) the use of the internal complaint system, 
4) behavioral art, such as giving a sweet potato to the judge.158 
Yang also said that sike only applies to criminal cases where the 
power of the government and power of the defendant are 
imbalanced.159 It is not appropriate to use the sike method in civil 
cases.160 In addition, Yang thinks lawyers should only sike on 
procedures and not substance issues because the only reason that 
caused lawyers to sike is the illegality of the procedure rather than 
the dispute of substance.161 
The die-hard lawyer seems less concerned about the particular 
client than the cause, and the cause is the advancement of justice 
and the rule of law in the Chinese criminal justice system.162 They 
care about procedural matters and about fundamental criminal 
defense rights.163 They care about the accurate application of the 
                                                                                                     
 157. See Yang Xuelin (杨学林), Yang Xuelin Lüshi: Lun Sike Pai Lüshi (杨学
林律师：论死磕派律师) [Lawyer Yang Xuelin: On Sike Lawyers], BOXUN.COM, (July 
31, 2017), https://www.boxun.com/news/gb/pubvp/2017/07/201707311218.shtml 
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deprived the accused and defenders of their litigation rights with their own 
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 160. See id. (“It can be seen that sike is not applicable to civil cases.”). 
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 162. See Vanderklippe, supra note 143 (describing the inability of lawyers to 
find justice in the courtroom as the reason why die-hard lawyers began using 
radical means of client advocacy). 
 163. See id. (“Whenever there is a little procedural problem [die-hard lawyers] 
will just fight to the death.”); see also Yang Xuelin, supra note 157 (describing 
die-hard lawyers’ focus on procedural issues); Ye Zhusheng (叶竹盛), Sike Pai 
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written law, as opposed to the law-of-the-moment as determined 
by the wishes of the State.164 And the State is paying attention.165 
They take cases where legal rights are being flouted, 
regardless of the client. Their opponent is the court establishment, 
namely the police[, the prosecution,] and even the judge. This 
adversarial stance has caught the attention of China’s second 
highest justice. “We are now seeing a very strange phenomenon,” 
wrote Shen Deyong, the executive vice-president of the Supreme 
People’s Court, China’s highest court, in a May 2013 essay 
published in the Communist Party-run People’s Court Daily. 
“[Defense] lawyers are not in a confrontation with prosecutors, but 
instead are having confrontations with the presiding judge in the 
case,” he complained.166 
The State prefers that lawyers be technically-sound 
practitioners who understand that their place is not to challenge 
the will of the State.167 Chinese authorities strongly prefer that 
                                                                                                     
Lüshi (死磕派律师) [The Die-Hard Sect], RENMIN WENZHAI (人民文摘) [PEOPLE’S 
DIGEST] http://paper.people.com.cn/rmwz/html/2013-11/01/content_1354207.htm 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (explaining that lawyers will resort to die-hard tactics 
if the court does not follow the Criminal Procedure Law) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 164. See Vanderklippe, supra note 143 (“‘In the courthouse, they stick to the 
law to the extreme.’”); see also Yang Xuelin, supra note 157 (describing die-hard 
lawyers’ insistence on the judiciary’s strict adherence to the law as written). 
 165. See Olesen, supra note 1 (“[T]he government is responding [to the 
die-hard’s impact] with an ‘increasingly repressive policy’ that is trying to rein in 
the legal profession.”); see also Alex W. Palmer, ‘Flee at Once’: China’s Besieged 
Human Rights Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/magazine/the-lonely-crusade-of-chinas-
human-rights-lawyers.html (describing the “709 Crackdown” on July 9, 2015, 
during which “more than 300 rights lawyers and activists from across [China] 
were targeted, with 27 forbidden to leave the country, 255 temporarily detained 
or forcibly questioned and 28 held in government custody”) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 166. Olesen, supra note 1. 
 167. See Olesen, supra note 1 (“‘These activist lawyers, who have wild 
intentions to challenge and change the law, have deviated’ from what their jobs 
are supposed to entail . . . .” (quoting Shan Renping, Opinion, Legal Activists Must 
Also Respect Rule of Law, GLOBAL TIMES (May 8, 2014), 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/859107.shtml (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice)). 
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“lawyers behave like dentists.”168 “In other words, the government 
thinks attorneys should be ‘good technicians and not involve 
themselves in cases of political-legal injustice.’”169 But it appears 
that crackdowns against activist lawyers are only breeding new 
activist lawyers and gaining them a public following.170 The 
Chinese Law on Lawyers stipulates that a “lawyer must accept the 
supervision of the state . . . .”171 The die-hard lawyers are treading 
in new territory, and are not accepting the raw supervision of the 
state. They place client and system reform interests above those of 
the CCP.172 They are not necessarily seeking the destruction of 
China, as the CCP would charge; instead, they seek what they 
believe would be a better China, one more open to dissent and free 
speech rights.173 
Stories of harassment and even physical violence against 
activist lawyers have become frequent.174 Threats, subtle and 
                                                                                                     
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. (“[T]he crackdowns . . . are only growing the ranks of ‘angry 
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 171. Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Lüshi Fa (中华人民共和国律师法) [Law. 
L of the People’s Republic of China], (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Sept. 1, 2017, effective Sept.1, 2017), art. 3. 
 172. See Palmer, supra note 165 (“[T]he rights lawyers were zealous, 
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 173.  See Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human Rights 
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Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 115th Cong. 7–8 (2017) (statement of Terence 
Halliday, Co-Director, Center on Law and Globalization, American Bar 
Foundation) [hereinafter Statement of Terence Halliday] (describing the legal 
ideals of die-hard lawyers). 
 174. See Palmer, supra note 165 (describing the treatment Chinese human 
rights lawyers due to their controversial advocacy); see also Gagging the Lawyers: 
China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers and Implications for U.S.-China 
Relations: Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 115th Cong. 10 
(2017) (statement of Teng Biao, Chinese Human Rights Lawyer, Visiting Scholar, 
Institute for Advanced Study, and Co-Founder, the Open Constitution Initiative 
and China Human Rights Accountability Center) [hereinafter Statement of Teng 
Biao] (“[In the 709 crackdown, d]ozens of lawyers were severely tortured, 
including beatings, electric shocks, sleep deprivation, death threats, months or 
years of solitary confinement, so on and so on.”).  
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overt, physical beatings, and even “disappearance” have 
occurred.175 Cao Shunli, for example, was an activist who died in 
detention after being denied medical treatment.176  
The 709 Crackdown did not end the die-hard model in the 
courtroom today. In December 2017, the defense lawyer in a highly 
publicized arson case in Hangzhou staged a walk-out from the 
court because he demanded the case to be tried in another province 
to avoid pressure from the public and outside influence.177 Despite 
the lawyers being rounded-up during the 709 Crackdown, the more 
commonly known die-hard lawyers often stay away from political 
cases, and only focus on criminal cases where abuses of power are 
observed and potential wrongful convictions are on the edge.178 
Those lawyers forced to disappear are all rights lawyers, while 
regular die-hard lawyers are mostly safe from criminal 
prosecution.179 However, two best known die-hard lawyers, Yang 
Jingzhu and Li Jingxing, were both disciplined by the bar, and 
Yang was recently disbarred after criticizing authorities with 
obscene language and disturbing the courtroom.180 
                                                                                                     
 175. See Palmer, supra note 165 (discussing the disappearance of lawyers and 
activists after the 709 crackdown and the use of “residential surveillance in a 
designated location” under the Chinese criminal code). 
 176. Detained Chinese Lawyers Admit Guilt in Disorder Charges: State 
Media, REUTERS (July 24, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/24/us-
china-rights-lawyer-idUSKCN0PY0I020150724 (on file with the Washington & 
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Stopped Trial], XIN JING BAO (新京报), (2017), 
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Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 178. See Alexa Olesen, Meet China’s Swaggering, ‘Diehard’ Criminal 
Lawyers, FOREIGN POLICY (May 16, 2014), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/16/meet-chinas-swaggering-diehard-criminal-
lawyers/ (discussing the criminal defense nature of die-hard lawyers in China) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 179. See id. (noting that the increased provocation of the government has 
caused die-hard lawyers to take up more “rights-related cases”). 
 180. See War on Human Rights Lawyers Continues: Up to 16 More Lawyers in 
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“Disappearances” and Forced Confessions 
In 2011, 2014, and then most intensely since July 2015, 
aggressive lawyers representing criminal defendants and human 
rights activists have been abused by the State.181 The State 
versions of events is that some lawyers have become criminals and 
needed to be taught a lesson about proper lawyer activity in 
China.182 For the most part, the crimes committed by these lawyers 
are for stirring up trouble, picking quarrels, and inciting 
subversion, which for the most part have no analog in US criminal 
law.183 So, in one sense, the State is correct that these lawyers are 
violating criminal law, but the laws and the conduct that violates 
them would not be recognizable to Westerners as criminal. 
                                                                                                     
China Face Disbarment or Inability to Practice, CHINA CHANGE (May 14, 2018), 
https://chinachange.org/2018/05/14/war-on-human-rights-lawyers-continues-up-
to-16-more-lawyers-in-china-face-disbarment-or-inability-to-practice/ (detailing 
the circumstances of Yang Jingzhu’s disbarment) (on file with the Washington & 
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file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 181. See Palmer, supra note 165 (describing the Chinese government’s 
treatment of rights lawyers and activists over the past few decades, which 
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Son of Imprisoned Human Rights Lawyer Xia Lin and a Student at Liberty 
University) [hereinafter Statement of Xia Chongyu] (describing the 2014 
abduction of his father due to his involvement in politically sensitive cases as a 
human rights lawyer). 
 182. See Olesen, supra note 178 (describing die hard lawyers as being seen as 
an enemy of China). 
 183. See Matt Ford, China’s Widening Crackdown on Lawyers, ATLANTIC (Jan 
14., 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/china-
lawyer-crackdown-arrest/424005/ (discussing subversion charges filed against 
prominent Chinese human rights lawyers by the Chinese government and the 
conviction of rights defense lawyer Pu Zhiqiang) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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Since Xi Jinping took power, combating Western influence has 
been one of his key goals.184 In June 2013, a documentary made by 
China’s National Defense University went viral on the Internet, 
alleging the United States was trying to sabotage the Chinese 
regime through the use of social media and non-governmental 
organizations.185 Scholars have noticed that releasing such videos 
are common before a Party Congress or the National People’s 
Congress (NPC), to get a sense of public reaction.186  
The Party Congress that followed in November 2013 
announced a series of reform plans, including legal reform.187 The 
NPC has since passed a series of laws regulating foreign influence 
in the country. In August 2014, the NPC started to revise the old 
State Security Law, which was eventually broken into two laws, 
the Anti-Spy Law, which became effective November 1, 2014, and 
the new State Security Law, which became effective July 1, 
                                                                                                     
 184. See ROBERT D. BLACKWILL & KURT M. CAMPBELL, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, XI JINPING ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY UNDER A 
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Defense University of People’s Liberation Army, Jiaoliang Wusheng (较量无声) 
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Contest’ Silenced, GLOBAL TIMES (Nov. 17, 2013, 7:23:01 PM), 
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2015.188 The NPC started reviewing the Foreign NGO Law 
December 2014.189 After several rounds of public comments, the 
law was passed in April 2016 and became effective January 1, 
2017.190 
When the Chinese Communist Party perceives a threat to the 
regime, it acts to suppress that threat. Before the July 2015 
crackdown, there was an earlier wave of arrests in 2011, following 
the Arab Spring, in which some lawyers (such as Teng Biao) 
encouraged people to protest in the street.191 The Arab Spring was 
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11/28/content_2032719.htm (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 191. See James Fallows, Arab Spring, Chinese Winter, ATLANTIC (Sept., 2011), 
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probably the time when CCP really started to worry that foreign 
influence could topple the regime.192 The propaganda videos 
released after the 2015 crackdown also bluntly used the hashtag 
“beware of color revolution.193 The term “color revolutions” 
described the post-Soviet revolutions in Eastern Europe such as 
Georgia’s Rose Revolution and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.194 
Under this overall theme, lawyers might be treated differently 
under different administrations, but the overall direction of 
repression and control by the state is the same. There were more 
physical beatings in the 2011 arrests than during the 709 
Crackdown, and in Gao Zhisheng’s autobiography, he explains that 
he was held extra-judicially in secret prisons before 2011 and was 
later detained in a more legalized manner (residential 
surveillance) after Xi took power.195 
During the Arab Spring, some Chinese scholars expected that 
a similar wave may spread to other authoritarian regimes such as 
China.196 The movement did not spread in China, but an isolated 
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 194. See THOMAS LUM & HANNAH FISCHER, CONG. RES. SERV., RL34729, 
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out Book of Abuses, GUARDIAN (June 15, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/15/gao-zhisheng-persecuted-
chinese-dissident-smuggles-out-book-of-abuses (describing accounts of Gao’s 
treatment contained in his memoir) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). See generally GAO ZHISHENG (高智晟), 2017 NIAN 
QILAI ZHONGGUO (2017年 起来中国) [2017 STAND UP CHINA] (2016) (describing the 
torture Gao suffered during his detainment and imprisonment).  
 196. See Fallows, supra note 191 (explaining that “Jasmine” protests emerged 
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“Jasmine Revolution” walk took place in Beijing’s busy commercial 
street Wangfujing in February 2011.197 Video of U.S. Ambassador 
Jon Huntsman on the scene was circulated on the internet and 
many Chinese nationalists were angered by the foreigner’s 
intention to interfere with the stability of the country.198 After the 
Wangfujing incident, many dissidents and lawyers were 
arrested.199 Those who were under investigation included Ai 
Weiwei, Jiang Tianyong, Li Heping, and Teng Biao. Jiang 
Tianyong recounted the interrogator asking him, “Do you really 
think you can successfully take over the regime and interrogate us 
in the future?”200 None of the lawyers or activists were criminally 
charged at the time. Many of them, such as Jiang Tianyong and Li 
Heping, were arrested again and convicted of crimes during the 
2015 crackdown.201  
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underlying the Arab Spring, social drivers of popular discontent in China are 
many . . . [t]hese factors have created accumulated tensions in China, fueling a 
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 198. See id. (explaining that Senator Hunstman’s appearance at the event 
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yelling at Senator Huntsman, “You want chaos for China, don’t you?”); see also 
Shane2406, U.S. Ambassador Jon Huntsman Spotted at Wangfujing Protest in 
Beijing, YOUTUBE (Nov. 22, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_dNNLeaw1s (showing Senator Huntsman 
at the Wangfujing incident) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 199. See Fallows, supra note 191 (explaining that the Chinese government 
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 200. Ai Weiwei, Ai Weiwei’s Interview with Lawyer Jiang Tianyong, YOUTUBE 
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with Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 201. See China: Latest Information on Crackdown Against Lawyers and 
Activists, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-
releases/2015/08/china-list-of-lawyers-and-activists-targeted/ (documenting the 
lawyers and activists targeted by police in the 2015 crackdown) (on file with the 
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The state security apparatus was also using different 
strategies on different people. In terms of foreigner versus 
Chinese, the state portrays itself as protecting the Chinese against 
subversive foreign powers. In terms of older, more experienced 
lawyers versus their younger and junior associates, the state 
played the role of a “protector” that prevented the naïve youngsters 
from stepping into the wrong direction in following the influence of 
a more experienced lawyer or mentor.  
In January 2016, China arrested Peter Dahlin, a Swedish 
legal NGO worker who had sponsored Fengrui Law Firm’s work.202 
In the news article, Peter Dahlin was accused of not properly 
registering his activities in China, avoiding financial supervision, 
receiving sponsorship from seven different foreign NGOs, and 
hyping up negative news and agitating conflicts against the 
government.203 He was released and expelled from China after he 
made a confession that was broadcasted on the television.204 
Li Heping’s 24-year-old associate Zhao Wei was detained for a 
year and released on parole with a letter confessing that she was 
being manipulated as a “chess piece” and denounced Li Heping’s 
work of “subversion.”205 In her letter, she described her dream of 
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2016), https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_foward_1422494 (on file with the 
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), Zhi Pengyoumen de Yifeng Xin (致朋友们的一封信) [A Letter to Friends], SINA 
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bringing positive change to the society and how her dream was 
manipulated by the rights lawyers.206 She regretted her naivety 
and vowed to start a new life.207  
The same protection mentality can be found in various official 
public service messages. In a poster made by Beijing State Security 
Bureau, posted at the entrances of some busy subway stations, a 
man had his head down, face covered by the hands.208 The big 
caption reads “you can turn back!” and, referencing article 28 of 
the Anti-Spy Law, suggests that if you were being recruited or 
coerced into spying against or subverting China, you may turn 
yourself in and be exonerated from criminal liability if you show 
remorse.209  
The state security also uses different tactics while detaining 
different people. Following his detention and torture, Gao 
Zhisheng recounted a conversation with a sympathetic police 
officer who told him that he was tortured because he was willing 
to make concessions after being tortured and that Liu Xiaobo was 
never tortured because the police knew torture would not work on 
Liu.210 
In May 2014, “Pu Zhiqiang, a Beijing-based civil rights lawyer, 
was detained by Beijing police . . . on the charge of provoking 
troubles . . . .”211 Later, in 2016, Pu was disbarred and jailed for 
“crossing the line” between lawyer and activist by daring to attend 
twenty-fifth anniversary Tiananmen Square commemorative 
events.212 Indeed the events commemorated his own actions 
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 211. Shan Renping, Opinion, Legal Activists Must Also Respect Rule of Law, 
GLOBAL TIMES (May 8, 2014), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/859107.shtml 
(on file at the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 212. Id. 
 
THE NEW BREED, “DIE-HARD” CHINESE LAWYER 141 
because he was there on June 4, 1989.213 Because a person cannot 
be a lawyer if he or she has a serious criminal conviction, Pu’s 
convictions made his disbarment inevitable.214 
Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强) was convicted of “inciting ethnic hatred” 
(煽动民族仇恨) and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (寻衅
滋事) in December 2015 and was sentenced to a three-year 
suspended sentence.215 He had already been confined for about 
nineteen months at the time of his conviction.216 
The only evidence against Pu were seven social media posts 
that Pu wrote on Weibo between 2011 and 2014.217 To Western 
eyes, his social media posts are ordinary comment and criticism of 
government actions and policies. He was arrested in May 6, 2014, 
three days after he had a meeting commemorating the June 4th 
Anniversary of Tiananmen Square.218 Several other participants 
were also arrested.219 Pu was initially investigated under the 
charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (寻衅滋事) and 
“illegally obtaining personal information” (非法获取公民个人信息
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).220 He was later additionally charged with “inciting subversion of 
the state” (煽动分裂国家罪) and “inciting ethnic hatred and ethnic 
discrimination” (煽动民族仇恨、民族歧视罪).221 The latter charge 
stemmed from his social media posts in support of the Uyghars, a 
predominantly Muslim population living mostly in the Xinjiang 
Autonomous Region of China.222 The post criticized the Chinese 
government treatment of the Uyghars.223 
Pu Zhiqiang was detained for more than a year before the 
criminal charges were brought against him.224 The prosecutor and 
police used all the extensions available under the Criminal 
Procedure Law to detain him without formal charges.225 The 
Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court extended the time before the trial 
period twice, adding an additional six months.226 
Pu Zhiqiang had participated in the hunger strike in 
Tiananmen Square in 1989 when he was a law student at China 
University of Politics and Law (CUPL).227 He obtained his lawyer’s 
license in 1995 and started to practice law in 1997.228 Since 2009, 
Pu had worked on several high-profile cases including Tan Zuoren 
case, Ren Jiayu’s Reeducation through Labor case, Ai Weiwei tax 
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Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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case, and Tang Hui’s Reeducation through Labor case.229 
(Re-education through labor was abolished under Xi Jinping’s legal 
reform in 2014.)230 
Lawyers such as Pu seem to be the forerunners of today’s 
die-hard criminal defense lawyers. An editorial explains:  
The problem is some of them have deliberately crossed the 
bottom line of the rule of law. It was reported that Pu was 
detained after he attended an anniversary event to 
commemorate the June 4th incident [Tiananmen Square 
resistance]. Whether there is a connection has not been 
officially confirmed, but it is obvious that such an event, which 
is related to the most sensitive political issue in China, has 
clearly crossed the red line of law.231 
 The problem, of course, is that the word “law” has two distinct 
meanings in China.232 On one hand, it is the words of the 
law-makers written in official codes.233 But “law” also appears to 
mean whatever is today’s will of those in power.234 It is this latter 
sense in which Pu clearly crossed the line, and Chinese activists 
and scholars are sensitive every day to where that line may be. The 
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accuracy of their perceptions and judgments in this regard is what 
keeps them out of jail. 
In July 2015, a significant round-up and detention of 
aggressive Chinese lawyers, dubbed the 709 Crackdown, 
occurred.235 This round-up and detention significantly increased 
the tension between the state and the activist lawyers, and so far, 
despite serious risk to themselves, the lawyers are not backing 
down.236 The rights lawyers rounded up included both aggressive 
criminal defense lawyers and lawyers who have represented 
unpopular clients in assertive civil rights cases. Some of the 
lawyers’ whereabouts still remain unknown and nearly all were 
denied the opportunity to meet with their own lawyers. In one 
instance, the client of one of the detained lawyers made a request 
for information regarding his lawyer’s whereabouts, but no 
response or information was forthcoming. Family members of some 
of the lawyers have been detained and questioned. Some of those 
detained have been warned against inquiring further about their 
loved ones. Other lawyers who were detained and released have 
been warned against pursuing the whereabouts of the still-
detained lawyers.  
This detention, even without criminal charge, is made possible 
by a provision of the Criminal Procedure Code, Residential 
Surveillance in a Designated Location (RSDL).237 Despite the use 
                                                                                                     
 235. Anthony Kuhn, Chinese Authorities Detain Nearly 150 Human Rights 
Lawyers, NPR (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/07/14/422952236/chinese-authorites-detain-nearly-150-
human-rights-lawyers (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice); Chun Han Wong, Human-Rights Lawyers Detained in China 
Confess, State Media Reports, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/human-rights-lawyers-detained-in-china-confess-
state-media-reports-1437307686 (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 236. See Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, China Targeting Rights Lawyers in 
a Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rights-
lawyers.html (noting that many activist lawyers are not being deterred by the 
“intense political pressure” and “previous imprisonment of lawyers under 
President Xi Jingping”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). 
 237. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉
 
THE NEW BREED, “DIE-HARD” CHINESE LAWYER 145 
of the word “residential,” nothing about this status resembles a 
house arrest. Instead, the detainee is typically kidnapped without 
warning, placed in a police car with a bag over the detainee’s head 
and taken to an unspecified location. Unless charges are brought 
or the status renewed, the detention can last six months. Typically, 
neither family nor the detainee’s lawyer are told about the 
detainee’s whereabouts. Thus, the term “disappeared” has been 
applied to this status of detention.238 
During the RSDL detention, food depravation, sleep 
deprivation, intense interrogation, threats to family, and 
occasional physical violence mark the experience of the 
disappeared person.239 
One goal appears to be to dissuade and intimidate the detainee 
and others from engaging in the aggressive lawyering that brought 
on the detention in the first place. A second goal is to extract a 
guilty plea, resulting in the disbarment of the lawyer, and a video 
confession to be publicly broadcast and written about in state print 
media.240 The video confessions are often bizarre, staged events. 
The confessions are tightly scripted, rehearsed and done in many 
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takes to get the desired effect.241 In the confessions, the detainees 
make statements that are entirely out of character and appear 
obviously to be nothing more than the price of release, along with 
the criminal conviction that follows. 
State media has reported extensively on the confessions of the 
detained lawyers. Among the chief targets of the crackdown, Zhou 
Shifeng, was the lawyer who represented families of victims of the 
toxic baby formula produced by Sanlu Milk Co. in 2008.242 Media 
reports his confession to the charges leveled against himself and 
his firm, charges “ranging from hyping up legal cases to spreading 
smears against China’s legal system.”243 The publicized 
confessions that precede any hearings or taking of evidence by a 
court have been a common feature of previous crackdowns against 
dissidents. To date, the public confessions seem not to have 
dampened the spirits of the rights lawyers.244 
In August 2016, four activists who were among those rounded 
up in July 2015 were sentenced for the crime of subverting state 
power.245 Beijing lawyer Zhou Shifeng was among the four and was 
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said to have influenced the others toward Western-style, open 
protest against Chinese law. Two of the other three were said to 
have operated an “illegal church.” The cases of the four, Zhou 
Shifeng (周世锋), Hu Shigen (胡石根), Zhai Yanmin (翟岩民), and 
Gou Hongguo (勾洪国) were tried together in Tianjin Intermediate 
Court. They were all convicted of “subversion of the state” [颠覆国
家政权罪] and all promised not to appeal.246 Zhou Shifeng was 
sentenced to seven years in prison under “subversion of the state” 
in Tianjin.247 Hu Shigen was sentenced for seven years and six 
months on August 3, 2016.248 Zhai Yanmin was sentenced for three 
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years with four more years suspended.249 Gou Hongguo was 
sentenced to three years in prison with a three year suspension on 
August 5, 2016.250 
Some US Embassy staff went to the Tianjin court on their 
diplomatic car. State security filmed the US diplomats and the 
diplomatic car and made a video mocking US involvement. The 
Ministry of Public Security posted the video on its Weibo account 
and generated a wave of nationalist reaction on the social media.251 
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In its editorial, the state newspaper said: 
Lawyers advocate for the law. But a few of them went to the 
other side of the law, and at one time won a certain degree of 
response on the Internet. This reflects how seriously the 
Western ideology has been infiltrating the country. Confronting 
the country’s basic political system, and inciting people to resist 
the country’s laws, the lawyers believed they were acting 
through freedom of expression. It is ridiculous.252  
The various defendants made uncharacteristic statements as 
part of their confessions to the charges, apparently reducing their 
sentences. Gou Hongguo pleaded guilty to subverting state power 
by “collude[ing] with a group of religious people, petitioners, 
lawyers and legal administrators to agitate in controversial cases 
and incite public hatred against the State . . . .”253 Guo said at his 
sentencing: “I’m grateful to the government for saving me and 
resolve not to participate in any criminal activities and will make 
a clean break with all those anti-government forces.”254 Hu Shigen, 
former college professor from Beijing and head of the illegal 
church, said the “trial was fair and just” and thanked the 
authorities for making sure he was properly treated for his 
“diseases.”255 Hu had “teamed up with some lawyers to embarrass 
the government” and promote a “peaceful transformation 
overthrow of the government leadership.256 These were the very 
lawyers, several like Zhou from the Fengrui law firm, who engaged 
in the aggressive tactics of the new breed of Chinese lawyer. 
Another Fengrui lawyer, Wang Yu 王宇, slated to receive a 
human rights award from the American Bar Association, was 
“released on parole awaiting trial” [取保候审] on July 22, 2016 after 
a six-month detention.257 Her statement258 accompanying her 
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release said that the ABA was using her to publicly smear the 
Chinese legal system.259 She publicly vowed to refuse to accept any 
such awards. “I am Chinese. I love my homeland. I’m not going to 
accept the award issued by foreigners.”260 Similar to other smear 
videos, the Communist Party League posted a video mocking the 
ABA giving an award to a chair261 (referring to the Nobel Peace 
Prize to Liu Xiaobo in 2010, when Liu was serving a prison 
sentence in China and the Nobel Prize ceremony reserved an 
empty chair on the podium honoring Liu.).  
The crackdown against such lawyers has persisted. Most 
recently, Yu Wensheng (余文生) was arrested on January 19, 2018 
for circulating an open letter calling for amending the 
constitution.262 Since his arrest, Yu’s wife Xu Yan had been 
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advocating for Yu’s release and met with several foreign media and 
embassies. Xu was detained by the police for several hours on April 
1 and was told not to speak up about the case. Yu Wensheng was 
formally charged for “inciting subversion of the state” [煽动颠覆国
家政权罪] and “obstruction of public service” [妨碍公务罪].263 
Yu’s lawyer license was revoked by the Beijing Justice Bureau 
on January 15, 2018.264 The official reason was that Yu was 
unemployed by any law firms for more than six months, a technical 
requirement of the Chinese Lawyer Law.265 Yu said the 
government forced his former employer to discharge him and 
threatened other law firms not the hire him.266 He was also not 
able to register his own law firm because of obstacles from the 
government.267 
Before his arrest, Yu Wensheng recorded a video claiming that 
he would not give up his right to choose his own attorney unless 
tortured.268 
Yu Wensheng was one of the lawyers hired by Wang 
Quanzhang’s wife, Li Wenzu, to defend Wang’s case, but he was 
not able to meet with Wang (none of the 709 lawyers were able to 
meet with lawyers hired by their families). Wang Quanzhang is 
still being detained today after more than a thousand days of 
                                                                                                     
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 263. Changyi Xiuxian Beizhua, Lu Weiquan Lüshi zao Zhengshi Daibu (倡议
修宪被抓，陆维权律师遭正式逮捕) [Initiative to Amend the Constitution and Lu 
Weiquan Lawyer Yu Wensheng was Formally Arrested], ZHONG YANGSHE (中央社) 
[CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY] (Apr. 20, 2018), 
http://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/201804200219-1.aspx (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 264. Yu Wensheng Lüshizheng bei Zhuxiao, Cheng zao Zhengfu “Daya Baofu”(
余文生律师证被注销，称遭政府“打压报复”) [Yu Wensheng’s Lawyer License 
Revoked, Claimed “Retaliation” from the Government], BBC NEWS CHINESE (Jan. 
17, 2018), http://www.bbcarabic.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-42710495 (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 265. See id. 
 266. See id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. Hong Kong Free Press, ‘I Will Not Accept Gov’t-Appointed Lawyer Unless 
Tortured,’ Arrested Chinese Lawyer Yu Wensheng Says, YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XD0VYOAPWoE (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 
152 25 WASH. & LEE L. J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 99 (2018) 
detention without a trial.269 Wang’s wife is still advocating for 
Wang’s release.270  
Yu Wensheng was originally detained in 2014 for supporting 
Hong Kong’s pro-democratic “Occupy Central” protest.271 He was 
not formally charged with a crime in 2014.  
Being an activist lawyer in China is not a safe activity. The 
numbers of such lawyers appears to be growing and despite the 
jailings and physical violence, they stayed determined in their 
work.  
What most impedes our work, though, is the revocation of our 
licenses to practice law. China’s cities and provinces have 
“lawyers’ associations” that appear to be modeled after the bar 
associations of Western countries, and these groups decide 
annually who is qualified to practice law. This is a good example 
of where pretense and reality diverge in China’s legal world. 
The lawyers’ associations are, in fact, puppets of the 
government whenever a political question arises. Last year my 
license to practice law was revoked.272 
The battle has been joined between the die-hard lawyers and 
the state. “These activist lawyers, who have wild intentions to 
challenge and change the law, have deviated from what their jobs 
are supposed to entail,” a state-oriented editorial said.273 The 
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editorial leveled a warning at the group, who must “realize that 
they are not commandos or the authoritative forces behind 
improvements to rule of law in China.”274 Such challenges seem 
only to further embolden the die-hards and their followers. 
VI. Comparisons with the American Civil Rights Cause Lawyer  
Beginning roughly seventy years ago, a new breed of lawyer 
was born in the United States.275 These lawyers cared about the 
“cause” as much or sometimes more than did their clients.276 These 
lawyers viewed their role as more than that of a traditional lawyer 
who represented, but was separate from, their clients.277 These 
lawyers threatened well-guarded social orders,278 as did the 
Chinese die-hards. They faced intense government and bar 
association repression and reproach.279 Their work largely started 
in the South, in the effort to press toward racial equality,280 and 
spread to causes opposing the Vietnam War,281 discrimination 
against women,282 mistreatment of the institutionalized, and 
organization of workers, tenants and consumers283. 
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Like their Die-Hard counterparts, these lawyers were 
subjected to threats, depravations, violence, and near-death.284 
The methods were different, to be sure. There was no RDSL, and 
civil rights lawyers who were arrested were largely permitted 
contact with their own lawyers and family.285 But at times, the 
intensity of reaction to their threat to social order was no less than 
the reaction has been to the die-hard lawyer. Consider a few 
examples. 
Following somewhat surprising success in defending Black 
defendants following racial violence in 1946 Tennessee, Thurgood 
Marshall was driving back to Nashville with three colleagues.286 
On the road, their car was confronted by a car occupied by police287 
and another occupied by local White citizens. The police stopped 
Marshall’s car and insisted that they must search for illegal alcohol 
or other contraband.288 None was present.289 Nonetheless, the 
police placed Marshall in the backseat of their car between two 
officers.290 They said he was to be returned to town to come before 
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a judge on a drunk driving charge.291 Marshall had not been 
drinking on that occasion.292 The police told his colleagues to 
continue driving to Nashville.293  
They began to drive, but had second thoughts and turned to 
follow the police.294 Instead of proceeding into town, the police car 
turned onto a dirt road that would end near a river.295 The 
colleagues followed.296 The police car stopped near the river where 
a lynch mob was waiting, surely meant for Marshall.297 When the 
colleagues pulled in behind the police car, the police told them to 
leave.298 They refused.299 In any event, even if they had turned and 
left, unless the police were now willing to turn them all over to the 
mob to be killed, the colleagues would be witnesses to the existence 
of the lynch mob and the police collaboration with it.300 Instead of 
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leaving Marshall with the mob, presumably as planned, the police 
drove back to the main road and into town where they presented 
Marshall to the local judge.301 The judge declared that Marshall 
had not been drinking and set him free from the police custody.302 
Marshall, later to litigate Brown v. Board, and still later to become 
the first Black Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States,303 was as close to being murdered as he could be that day. 
If not for the actions of his colleagues, the course of history and his 
influence on it would have been dramatically altered. 
One of Marshall’s colleagues that very day was Alexander 
Looby,304 arguably the most successful civil rights lawyer in 
Tennessee. He went on from that day with Marshall in 1946 to file 
the first desegregation suit against the Nashville public schools.305 
When the student sit-ins began in Nashville in 1960 he became 
their first attorney, an action that resulted in violent response 
against him.306 Fourteen years after Looby and his colleagues 
probably saved Marshall’s life, on April 19, 1960, his house was 
bombed and almost entirely demolished, as well as shattering 
neighbors’ doors and windows.307 Fortunately, he and his wife were 
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asleep in a back room of the house and escaped the serious injuries 
undoubtedly intended.308 
Some five years later, a promising young lawyer who was 
threating the social order in Charlotte, North Carolina, Julius 
Chambers, also narrowly avoided violent death.309 Chambers had 
filed the school desegregation claims on behalf of parents in 
Mecklenberg County, North Carolina, in what would eventually 
become the landmark case of Swann v. Mecklenberg County, 
upholding the use of busing to desegregate schools.310 While 
making a speech at a church not long after he had filed those 
claims, his car was bombed.311 He and others went outside, 
inspected the damage, and he returned to finish his speech.312 
Undeterred, he filed more than 50 school desegregation complaints 
and was also known for threatening the racial order attached to 
perhaps an even more sacredly guarded activity: Football.313 
Chambers had filed a claim on behalf of a record-setting Black high 
school football player who could not be chosen for a local all-star 
game because of his race.314  
Marshall, Looby, and Chambers were not alone in being 
violently terrorized by authorities and the locals with whom they 
conspired.315 David Lipman had a rifle put his mouth for 
                                                                                                     
 308. Id. 
 309. See Jim Morrill, 50 Years Ago: Bombs Ignited Night of Terror, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article45744905.html (describing the targeted bombing of Julius 
Chambers’ car) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 310. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
(holding that the busing of students is included in the scope of school authorities’ 
duties to eliminate racial segregation in public schools as mandated by the United 
States Supreme Court). 
 311. Morrill, supra note 309. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Jim Morrill, 50 Years Ago: Bombs Ignited Night of Terror, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article45744905.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 315. See VOICES OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYERS 200–01 (Kent Spriggs ed., Univ. 
Press of Fla., 2017). 
 
158 25 WASH. & LEE L. J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 99 (2018) 
monitoring an election in Mississippi,316 others were punched or 
beaten,317 and many jailed for “practicing law without a license,” a 
crime that under normal circumstances would never produce 
arrest and jail, particularly when the defendant was indeed a 
lawyer in good standing in a state other than the arresting 
venue.318  
Especially in school desegregation cases, these new lawyers 
drew the ire and reproach of traditional lawyers and the organized 
bar. Following Brown, a strategy of fending off its mandate 
emerged in the South, alternately called The Southern Manifesto 
or Massive Resistance.319 The strategy was formulated by no less 
than two United States Senators, one each from South Carolina 
and Virginia.320 It was carried out by countless state and local 
government officials.321 A central theme of this strategy was to 
resist desegregation on the local level despite the Brown mandate, 
forcing an almost county-by-county enforcement by desegregation 
activists. The only path to the enforcement of Brown was for 
NAACP and other activist lawyers to go to community gatherings 
in small towns to discuss the possibilities for a local desegregation 
law suit.322 Coming out from behind their desks to meet 
prospective clients, these lawyers offended traditional 
sensibilities, not to mention the politics and social preferences of 
traditional lawyers, especially southern white lawyers.323 They 
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were doing what their clients needed, they were pursuing a cause, 
and they used means that were more aggressive and outside 
common lawyer practice. The backlash was intense, with bar 
associations and government authorities accusing these lawyers of 
unethical conduct: solicitation of clients, stirring up litigation, and 
the like, all in violation of newly-modified-to-the-task barratry and 
champerty laws.324 Like today’s die-hard Chinese lawyers who are 
using social media to reach outside the traditional 
lawyer-advocacy-in-court mode,325 these lawyers were breaking 
molds that produced negative, sometimes angry response from 
government and their profession. 
Harassment of Southern lawyers who represented civil rights 
workers was fierce.326 A very few white Southern lawyers were 
willing to represent civil rights workers in the deep South.327 
Among the few who did, at least one was disbarred in 
Mississippi.328 A Black lawyer representing school desegregation 
plaintiffs in Mississippi was harassed by a federal district judge 
regarding his professionalism, threatened with findings of 
professional misconduct, and interrogated long enough to fill 118 
pages of transcript.329 The harassment continued until the court of 
appeals said that the district judge was creating “humiliation, 
anxiety, and possible intimidation of a . . . reputable member of the 
bar.”330 The claims against the lawyer were entirely baseless. “All 
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of the testimony taken in this matter . . . completely exonerates 
Brown from any improper conduct.”331  
Once Northern lawyers began to undertake representation 
and organization of Southern civil rights clients and causes, new 
forms of professional harassment emerged.  
Among the lawyers whose work acted as a lightning rod for 
organized bar criticism was William Kunstler.332 Kunstler’s 
identification with his activist clientele broke sharply with 
traditional lawyer norms of professional separation from clients 
and earned him a folk hero status among law students and young 
lawyers.333 Kunstler went from representing civil rights workers 
including Mississippi Freedom Riders334 and other protesters in 
the South, to Black Panthers,335 to the Chicago Seven.336 Kunstler 
was not a large firm, New York lawyer who took up civil rights 
causes.337 His early practice in the 1950s was characterized by 
undistinguished representation in will, domestic relations, and 
real estate closing matters, with one ironic exception: referred by 
classmate Roy Cohn, Kunstler drafted a will for the 
soon-to-be-infamous Joseph McCarthy.338  
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As a traveling civil rights activist lawyer, Kunstler needed pro 
hac vice admission in various courts to represent his clients, which 
was not always freely given.339 Interestingly, Kuntsler regarded 
himself as a modern-day, “itinerant lawyer in the colonial 
tradition.”340 The image of Lincoln, riding circuit with his 
colleagues from rotating court-day to court-day341 is not one that 
traditional lawyers would have attached to Kunstler. And to be 
sure, the political nature of their practices bears no comparison 
whatever. But in another sense, the comparison to a 17th or 18th 
century lawyer traveling from court to court to meet his clients and 
represent them, is apt. The mode of transportation and its speed 
and capacity had changed dramatically, but it was true that 
Kunstler seemed to be everywhere, especially throughout the 
South in the 1960s. Between the time of colonial lawyers and later 
Lincoln’s circuit-riding and Kunstler’s traveling civil rights lawyer 
show, UPL (unauthorized practice of law) restrictions on 
cross-border law practice had become far more stringent.342 
The Chicago Seven representation won him national attention 
and, in some circles, derision.343 The circus nature of the Chicago 
trial, and especially Kunstler’s openly hostile, two-way war with 
Judge Julius Hoffman, produced four years’ worth of contempt 
citations which were later reversed by the Seventh Circuit. 344 The 
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bar reaction to his ferocious representation in Chicago was 
strikingly swift.345 The Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York so anxiously awaited the opportunity to discipline Kunstler 
that it began proceedings before the Chicago Seven trial had 
ended, violating its own rules of procedure.346 
In the end, confession came, as some elements within the 
organized bar realized that repressive mistakes had been made, 
especially in the context of efforts to chill zealous representation of 
the so-called “new left.”347 The bar had “misconstrued . . . the 
dimensions and causes of courtroom disorders . . . confus[ing] zeal 
in the defense of clients with revolution . . . [in its movement to] 
intimidate defense counsel.”348 Like the Die-Hard lawyer, Kunstler 
challenged the government orthodoxy and he paid a price for it. 
As they had to Kunstler, responding to outsiders with law 
practice restrictions was a key measure for southern 
lawyer-dominated legislatures.349 Five southern states enacted 
harsher restrictions on client getting, unauthorized practice, and 
community organizing activities, in an effort to prevent outside 
lawyers (especially NAACP lawyers) from organizing and 
recruiting plaintiffs for school desegregation cases that would force 
compliance with Brown v. Board. The Virginia bar’s efforts to keep 
outside lawyers outside resulted in the Supreme Court’s entry into 
the fray in NAACP v. Button.350 The NAACP and its affiliate, the 
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N.Y. TIMES Magazine 34 (Feb. 21, 1974) (discussing the grievance committee’s 
departure from standard policy of “waiting until all appeals have been heard 
before bringing disciplinary action”). 
 346. See id. (same). 
 347. Id. 
 348. NORMAN DORSEN & LEON FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT: REPORT OF 
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON 
COURTROOM DISORDER xiii–xvi (1973). 
 349. See Edward F. Sherman, The Right to Representation by Out-of-State 
Attorneys in Civil Rights Cases, in ARTICLES BY MAUER FACULTY 65 (1968) (“[A]fter 
the large demonstrations and mass arrest subsided and civil rights law practice 
in the South shifted from defense to affirmative suits, the lenient attitude of 
southern courts towards out-of-state attorneys began to change.”). 
 350. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
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Legal Defense Fund (LDF) had chapters in Virginia.351 Through 
these chapters, Virginia residents were informed of the possibility 
of pursuing school desegregation suits by retaining NAACP and 
LDF lawyers.352 Lawyers affiliated with the NAACP were paid a 
per diem during such representation, but often without any other 
form of compensation.353 The Virginia State Bar proceeded against 
these lawyers and the NAACP on the ground that their conduct 
amounted to inappropriate solicitation of business and, in 
particular, that the NAACP, which was not a party to the various 
school desegregation litigation, had unlawfully interjected itself 
into litigated matters by soliciting plaintiffs and supplying 
lawyers.354 The Virginia courts held that the NAACP lawyers had 
acted unethically.355 The Virginia courts asserted that the statutes’ 
purpose was to uphold high standards of the legal profession by 
“strengthen[ing] the existing statutes to further control the evils of 
solicitation of legal . . . [s]olicitation of legal business has been 
considered and declared from the very beginning of the legal 
profession to be unethical and unprofessional conduct.”356 
Eliminating the activities of the NAACP at that juncture would 
likely have spelled an end to school desegregation in Virginia for 
the foreseeable future. The Supreme Court reversed the Virginia 
courts’ treatment of the issue, holding that such an application of 
the solicitation rules violated expression and association rights 
under the First and Fourteenth amendments.357 
                                                                                                     
 351. See id. at 421 (discussing the involvement of Defense Fund lawyers in 
litigation in Virginia).  
 352. Id. 
 353. See id. at 420–21 (describing the payment of Defense Fund lawyers by 
the Virginia Conference as “a per diem fee not to exceed [sixty dollars], plus 
out-of-pocket expenses”). 
 354. See id. at 419 (analyzing whether solicitation of clients by the Defense 
Fund and the NAACP was unethical and in violation of Chapter 33 of the Virginia 
Code). 
 355. See NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 155, 116 S.E.2d 55, 66 (1960) 
(holding that the actions of the NAACP constituted "fomenting and soliciting legal 
business in which they are not parties and have no pecuniary right or liability”). 
 356. Id. at 154. 
 357. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (“We conclude that 
although the petitioner has amply shown that its activities fall within the First 
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Both federal courts and the executive branch in some ways 
protected the civil rights lawyer from mistreatment at the hands 
of state and local officials. In this respect, the Chinese Die-Hard 
lawyer is markedly different. 
David Mays was an example of a moderate segregationist 
lawyer, whose views of civil rights lawyers would today be 
regarded as extreme.358 Mays was congratulated and thanked 
repeatedly for his Gray Commission role at a 1955 Virginia State 
Bar meeting, the same meeting at which the organization adopted 
a resolution condemning the Supreme Court for its invasion of 
states’ rights in Brown.359 
Mays, the moderate who was praised by his fellow lawyers for 
stabilizing the radical segregationists,360 referred to W. Hale 
Thompson of Newport News as that “unbelievably 
arrogant . . . nigger lawyer.”361 Thompson had dared to suggest in 
a Gray Commission public hearing that “Thomas Jefferson, James 
Madison and Patrick Henry would be ashamed of some members 
of the [Virginia] General Assembly.”362 
When Mays described the pleasure of having two former FBI 
men play surreptitiously-made recordings of NAACP lawyer 
conversations with plaintiffs in the Prince Edward County case 
and the Charlottesville case, he made no mention of whether he 
                                                                                                     
Amendment’s protections, the State has failed to advance any substantial 
regulatory interest . . . which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has 
imposed.”). Other “association” cases followed, arising largely from a new ethos of 
cause or issue lawyering that accompanied the first federally funded legal aid 
programs. 
 358. See DAVID J. MAYS, RACE, REASON, AND MASSIVE RESISTANCE 2 (James R. 
Sweeney ed., 2008) (“A product of white society in the early-twentieth-century 
South, [Mays] retained the attitudes of that time, although his temperament and 
his legal training prevented him from taking extreme positions.”) 
 359. See id. at 62 (discussing the praise that Mays’ peers gave him pertaining 
to his views on segregation and with the Gray Commission of 1954). 
 360. See id. (“Many lawyers have made it clear to me that they look upon me 
as the stabilizing influence that has prevented a stacked commission from taking 
radical action” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 361. See id. at 85–86 (suggesting that Mays was referring to W. Hale 
Thompson when he referred to a speaker at a Gray Commission public hearing as 
“one nigger lawyer [who] was unbelievably arrogant.”). 
 362. Id. 
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was listening to an intrusion on the lawyer-client relationship.363 
Instead he said, “These may prove very helpful in probable 
proceedings by the [Virginia State Bar] against Oliver Hill [a 
preeminent school desegregation lawyer] and possibly others.” No 
evidence appears to exist that Hill was ever charged, but his 
colleague Samuel Tucker was repeatedly brought before bar 
authorities and charged with misconduct.364 Mays openly favored 
the bills introduced by Charles Fenwick and Harrison Mann, 
which he thought was meant to “harass the NAACP.”365  
In correspondence with Sidney Carleton, a former President of 
the Mississippi State Bar, ABA President Lewis Powell, long 
regarded as a voice of moderation in the profession and later on the 
Supreme Court, registered his views on Northern lawyers who 
represented Southern Blacks. Carleton, in an angry response to 
National Lawyers Guild (NLG) representation in Mississippi, said: 
[T]here has never been a time when the lawyers of the state of 
Mississippi have not stood ready, willing, and able to represent 
those in need of legal representation. It has not, however, been 
the policy of either the Mississippi State Bar nor of its members 
to violate public policy or to engage in the unethical practices or 
to become accessories before the fact by agreeing in advance to 
represent persons in criminal proceedings arising from 
contemplated actions not then having occurred.366 
Powell replied to Carleton with praise for the Mississippi Bar, in 
language that implies negative views of NAACP and NLG lawyers 
who had organized the school desegregation plaintiffs such as 
those at issue in Button: 
                                                                                                     
 363. See id. at 191 (describing two former FBI agents playing recordings of 
conversations with plaintiffs in the Prince Edward County and Charlottesville 
NCAAP cases). 
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My own view is that your bar took a fine step in its recent 
resolution on this subject. I think all of the southern bars should 
do the same thing, and follow them up with actual 
representation of Negroes—not to foment litigation but to 
defend those accused of crime. This is the best way I know to 
keep northerners from ‘invading’ the southern states. I am 
afraid nothing can keep some of the radicals from defaming the 
South generally without the slightest recognition that 
lawlessness in the northern cities is on a larger scale.367 
Powell’s and Carleton’s remarks echo the resistance of the 
Chinese authority to the undermining ideas and interference of 
foreigners. Western interference and dangerous influence, 
including an ABA Human Rights award issued to Wang Yu, 
threaten the Chinese authority. For Southern lawyer-leaders, the 
foreign influence to be resisted came from the “invasion” of 
Northern lawyers and organizations. 
Meanwhile, labor unions endeavored to provide counsel to 
their members, and federally-funded legal aid lawyers organized 
tenants and farm workers and represented entire classes of 
welfare recipients, institutional inmates and others. Still other 
lawyers sought to represent middle class clients at lower cost, 
using office automation and high client-volume generated by 
bar-prohibited advertising. 
In every instance the profession objected. In part, to be sure, 
the objections were motivated by opposition to the causes advanced 
by the new style of lawyer, but the objections were also to the new 
style of lawyering itself. To the traditional, one-client-at-a-time 
lawyer, whose clients found the lawyer through word of mouth in 
clubs and churches and social organizations rather than through 
advertising, this aggressive new style of lawyering was 
unprofessional, distasteful and demeaning to the profession 
generally. For these traditional lawyers, who not coincidentally 
represented corporate interests, cause lawyering was not proper 
lawyering at all, and it had to be stopped. Cause lawyers identified 
not exclusively with the private interests of clients, but to a great 
degree with the cause missions of the lawyers themselves. Cause 
lawyers pursued reform or closure of substandard prisons, jails 
and mental health facilities; they organized tenants, farm workers, 
and public assistance recipients; they identified specific laws and 
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worked toward their reform. Like the Chinese die-hard lawyer 
whose goal is to reform the criminal justice system or the human 
rights policies of the state, the client was in some ways a vehicle 
for the reform work of the lawyer. And for both, traditional lawyers 
and the state itself objected vociferously.  
The profession’s impression of this new form of lawyering was 
accurate. Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach called for 
“new techniques, new services, and new forms of intra-professional 
cooperation to . . . analyze the rights of welfare recipients, of 
installment purchasers, of people affected by slum housing, crime 
and despair.”368 “There are signs, too,” he noted, “that a new breed 
of lawyers is emerging, dedicated to using the law as an 
instrument of orderly and constructive social change.”369 Charles 
Hamilton Houston viewed the mission of the Howard Law School, 
to which he brought respectability and accreditation, as the 
creation of “social engineers” capable of making real the teachings 
of sociological jurisprudence that emerged during the first half of 
the twentieth century.370 It was to be a cause-lawyer school. 
Neither Katzenbach’s nor Houston’s vision of lawyering meshed 
with the profession’s status-quo, and it met resistance from the 
organized bar as a result. Lawyers who were as fully committed to 
their clients’ cause as were their clients threatened to disrupt the 
classical image of lawyers as being entirely independent and 
separate from their clients’ goals.371 
In China, many of the detained human rights advocates and 
their lawyers were champions of the peaceful transition theory, 
under which advocates believed that the moves toward market 
economy in China would pave the way for non-violent reform of the 
political system and elimination of the CCP’s strangle-hold on 
                                                                                                     
 368. Id. at ch. 5. 
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power.372 This theory invoked fear among CCP leadership, likening 
it to the color revolutions and the Arab Spring uprisings. The CCP 
reaction compares with the fears of US corporate and political 
power structures that cause lawyers’ empowerment of workers, 
tenants, and the poor were essentially subversive of the status quo. 
Fierce criticism of poverty lawyers and civil rights activist 
lawyers came from the highest levels of judicial, government and 
bar leadership. Ronald Reagan was “openly hostile to legal services 
lawyers,” first as Governor of California and later as President of 
the United States.373 Warren Burger, in his pleas for civility,374 
gave substantial blame for the impending downfall of the 
profession to lawyers in political trials, or as Burger called them, 
the “new litigation.”375 He encouraged the legal profession to apply 
“rigorous powers of discipline” to the misbehaving lawyers by 
either the judicial or bar enforcement systems.376 Failure to do so, 
he warned, would allow “the jungle [to] clos[e] in on us.”377 Bar 
leaders and commentators followed the Chief Justice’s lead.378 
As ABA President, Powell was a vocal condemnor of civil 
disobedience, repeatedly decrying the actions of sit-in 
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demonstrators’ and Freedom Riders’ testing of discriminatory laws 
regulating racial treatment in the South.379  
We have witnessed, over the past decade, the development of a 
heresy that could threaten the foundations of our system of 
government under law. This is the doctrine that each person 
may determine for himself what laws are “just,” and that laws 
and court orders are to be obeyed only so long as this seems ‘just’ 
to the individuals or groups concerned . . . . In 1965 many 
people believed that civil disobedience of orders and laws 
deemed to be unjust is a legitimate means of asserting rights 
and attaining objectives. Indeed, it is not too much to say that 
this form of civil disobedience—and its own unique tactics of 
demonstrations, sit-ins, lie-downs and mob pressure—has 
become the principal weapon of certain minority and dissident 
groups . . . . But our Constitution and tradition contemplate the 
orderly assertion of these rights.380 
He did not mention states and state bar associations that were 
resisting the Brown mandate, ostensibly because they were of the 
view that it was unjust. 
Professional opposition and harassment of legal aid lawyers 
proceeded in part on the ground that state bars and powerful 
institutional interests saw their economic and political interests 
threatened by the lawsuits and legislative lobbying being done by 
cause lawyers on behalf of their clients.381 
State and local bar associations in California, Texas, Florida, 
Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. unsuccessfully sued the Office 
of Economic Opportunity (OEO), claiming it was violating ethical 
canons.382 They claimed that legal services lawyers were engaged 
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in unauthorized practice and were unlawfully soliciting clients.383 
In doing so, they were largely reacting to the new, aggressive style 
of lawyering. These lawyers did not wait in their offices for clients 
to come; instead they sought clients to pursue the lawyers’ causes. 
These lawyers did not pursue ordinary contract, commercial, tort 
and property claims. Instead, they sought social reform. They 
worked toward closing inhumane prisons and mental institutions, 
they organized tenants and farm workers, they worked to reform 
public assistance laws, and establish enhanced rights for criminal 
defendants. All of this drew the ire of the established power 
structures, both corporate and legal. In this way, US civil rights 
lawyers do resemble Chinese die-hard and human rights lawyers: 
both groups broke ranks with the traditional lawyering methods 
and practices of their predecessors. 
Perhaps the most vociferous fight between legal aid lawyers 
and a coalition of business and government interests was spawned 
by the California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) organization and 
representation of farm workers.384 CRLA moved in a variety of 
ways to increase wages for farm workers and demand government 
services for them.385 These lawsuits drew the ire and outrage of 
then Governor Ronald Reagan and Senator George Murphy, 
speaking and acting on behalf of the California agribusiness 
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industry.386 At the time, state governors had the power to veto 
funding for their state’s federally funded legal aid programs, but 
that veto could be over-ridden by the OEO Director.387 Only once 
was a California governor’s veto sustained: In 1970, Governor 
Ronald Reagan vetoed the funding and the veto was sustained by 
then-OEO Director Donald Rumsfeld.388 Unsuccessful efforts by 
Murphy would have placed full control of legal services programs 
in the hands of governors, localizing control to suppress locally 
unpopular legal aid activities, and would have prohibited legal aid 
suits against the government.389 The latter effort was a part of a 
national affront to the successes of legal aid lawyers in various 
government-defendant matters, especially in the arena of welfare 
reform.390 
In some instances, courts refused to certify legal aid 
organizations whose community organizing went beyond 
traditional law service bounds.391 A New York Appellate Division 
objected to certifying more than one legal services provider for a 
particular county, for fear of their “unseemly[] competition” for 
representation of non-paying clients, and out of worry that the 
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court could not maintain minimum standards of conduct.392 The 
court also expressed concern about the applicants’ mixing of 
community action goals and legal service.393  
Along with labor union lawyers, federally funded legal aid 
lawyers were a significant part of the new style of lawyering, cause 
or group lawyering, that did not go unchallenged by the organized 
bar and, acting through the bar, powerful economic interests. The 
standard one-client- at-a-time model of lawyering did not suit the 
goals of legal aid lawyers and union lawyers. Their strength lay in 
collective action that allowed a marshaling of modest resources in 
pursuit of a cause. The standard bar obstruction first took the form 
of unauthorized practice restrictions and later advertising and 
solicitation rules.  
Having failed in its efforts to restrict the activities of school 
desegregation lawyers,394 the Virginia State Bar worked to stifle 
opportunities for labor unions to provide counsel to their 
members.395 And the Illinois Bar initially prevented the United 
Mine Workers from hiring inside, house counsel.396 Each of these 
efforts was rejected by a Supreme Court whose decisions fostered 
the accumulation of power through collective legal action. 
“Collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the 
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First 
Amendment.”397 The Court’s rejection of the bar’s insistence on the 
traditional one lawyer-one client notion of lawyering laid the legal 
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groundwork for legal aid lawyers’ representation of causes, groups, 
and social issues, rather than individual clients. This sort of 
representation presented the shocking circumstance for powerful 
economic interests and government agencies, not used to having to 
deal with poor people on so nearly an equal footing. As the lawyer 
in charge of OEO programs in California put it, “What we have 
created in CRLA [California Rural Legal Assistance] is an 
economic leverage equal to that of large corporations. Clearly that 
should not be.”398 The mere concept of such power residing in poor 
people and their lawyers seemed foreign, dangerous and 
subversive to the legal profession.  
Lawyers representing causes could not simply wait in their 
offices for the causes to arrive in the personage of an eligible client. 
While Attorney General, Nicholas Katzenbach tried to deter bar 
application of advertising and solicitation restrictions against 
poverty lawyers when he announced that lawyers should “go out to 
the poor rather than wait . . . to be reduced to inaction by ethical 
prohibitions is to let the canons . . . serve the cause of injustice.”399 
Katzenbach was an officer of the federal executive branch, which 
along with the federal courts, supported the cause lawyer.400 The 
Chinese Die-Hard lawyer has no such champion in the Chinese 
state apparatus. 
An uneasy measure of conditional cooperation regarding 
federally-funded legal aid eventually emerged from the organized 
bar at the national level.401 Even as the ABA began to co-operate 
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with federally funded legal services, its best and most able 
spokespersons continued to put an unduly positive face on the 
organization’s prior record of opposing meaningful legal services 
for the poor. William McCalpin, who was truly instrumental in 
shaping the ABA’s more enlightened position on legal services, 
prefaced his strong advocacy for support of legal services by 
imagining an ABA previously unaware of the legal needs of the 
poor: “[R]ecently we have begun to be aware of the possible legal 
needs of 40,000,000 disadvantaged citizens . . . .”402 The prior 
month’s issue of the same ABA Journal featured an article by 
Marvin Frankel that began with a statement more reflective of 
reality outside the walls erected by the ABA: “It is no new discovery 
that the promise of equal justice is a hollow one for people too poor 
to retain counsel.”403  
The ABA supported the new federal legal services program, 
provided that those services were “performed by lawyers in 
accordance with ethical standards of the legal profession.”404 Legal 
aid lawyers, like any lawyers in other fields, were expected to 
comply with normal ethical rules. However, courts had not yet 
reformed the rules regarding solicitation,405 and consequently legal 
                                                                                                     
attorneys in the delivery of civil legal services. While the organized bar was 
generally supportive of LSC, certain segments of the legal profession remained 
unfamiliar with legal services practice, felt threatened by legal services advocacy, 
and, in some instances, were hostile to LSC’s mission.”). 
 402. F. William McCalpin, The Bar Faces Forward, 51 A.B.A.J. 548, 550 
(1965). 
 403. Marvin E. Frankel, Experiments in Serving the Indigent, 51 A.B.A.J. 460, 
460 (1965) (hoping against some of the early evidence that the ABA would allow 
new, OEO funded legal services offices to be established rather than merely 
pressing for additional funding for the traditional legal aids under the supervision 
of NLADA); interview by Olavi Maru with F. William McCalpin, Aug. 22, 1975, 
http://www.abf-sociolegal.org/oralhistory/mccalpin.html, Tape MCA-1-B (noting 
that ironically, some years later in an oral history of his ABA involvement, 
McCalpin himself described the unfortunate, introspection practiced by the ABA 
in dealing with difficult issues) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 404. McCalpin, supra note 402, at 551 (quoting Richard Pious, Congress, the 
Organized Bar, and the Legal Services Program, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 418, 420–21 
(1972)) (discussing the political background for the ABA House of Delegates 
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 405. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 423–25 (1978) (stating that the 
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aid and cause lawyers engaged in community organizing were 
subject to continued harassment by bar authorities for direct 
solicitation of clients.406 
VII. Concluding Thoughts 
Fifty to seventy years later, some wounds of the war on civil 
rights lawyers remain, but such lawyering is no longer so far 
outside the mainstream. Although this reality continues to distress 
some with long memories of what they consider more civil times, 
there is no doubt that the more aggressive style of lawyering 
created by the cause lawyers of the 1960s and 1970s is a part of 
today’s American legal profession.  
How will Chinese lawyering look in fifty to seventy years? No 
one can be sure. Nonetheless, the reaction to the July 2015 
round-up and detention of rights lawyers offers some clues and 
some parallels with the experience of American civil rights 
lawyers.  
This round-up and detention significantly increased the 
tension between the state and the activist lawyers, and so far, 
despite serious risk to themselves, the lawyers are not backing 
down.407 Despite being warned against continued aggressive 
activity, current trends indicate that the state pressure appears to 
be having the opposite effect, with more lawyers answering the call 
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of staunch criminal defense and human rights lawyering.408 
Despite the intense and politically repressive environment, more 
lawyers are joining the ranks of the die-hard segment.409 
Yu Wengsheng, a commercial lawyer in Hong Kong, is typical 
of these newly minted activists. When Yu’s client was arrested for 
involvement in the annual Hong Kong turn-back day protests—
demanding more self-government and democratic selection 
processes in Hong Kong—Yu attempted to visit his client in 
detention.410 Yu felt outraged when he was prohibited from seeing 
his client, given his long background of ordinary commercial work 
and the absence of any previous criminal defense or activist 
work.411 Yu organized his own protests outside the jail on behalf of 
his client, and was promptly arrested himself.412 Now, Yu says, “I 
used to think being a lawyer was just a tool to make money . . . . 
But now I believe we have a greater mission to change a broken 
system. The crackdown is fierce, but we rights lawyers will fight 
back.”413 
Indeed, as Yu said, “the crackdown is fierce.”414 “This mass 
crackdown on lawyers is the broadest in terms of location, and 
clearly coordinated because of the timing of the initial crackdown,” 
said Sharon Hom, executive director of Human Rights in China.415 
                                                                                                     
 408. See Abby Seiff, China’s Latest Crackdown on Lawyers is Unprecedented, 
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“It included more than 23 provinces. It was a combination of 
detentions, disappearances and targeting family members, 
together with a very clear propaganda smear campaign in 
the People’s Daily. This is clearly a mass attack on lawyers that’s 
misusing legal process, using propaganda and then bringing back 
the collective punishment of China’s past by targeting the 
families.”416 
The attack consists not only of the 2015 round-up of more than 
200 lawyers, law firm staff, human rights activists, and family 
members, two of whom probably remain in detention in 2018,417 
but of a state media blitz smearing the detained lawyers.418 State 
media outlets such as Xinhua and others have painted the rights 
lawyers in terms reminiscent of the complaints about the conduct 
of American civil rights lawyers.419 The state media reports the 
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accusations against the lawyers as “stirring up” trouble,420 and of 
supporting protests on behalf of the lawyers’ clients, echoing 
Southern states use of a barratry and champerty statutes to deter 
American civil rights lawyer from stirring up litigation, and of 
participating in civil rights protests to aid their clients.421 The 
Chinese lawyers stand accused of “seriously interfering with 
normal judicial activities and disrupting social order.”422 The 
likeness to the accusations against US civil rights lawyers is 
striking. 
A further sign that Chinese authorities may actually be 
creating more cause lawyers rather than deterring them is a 
petition movement begun by a group of prominent lawyers in 
response to a 2015 crackdown that led to the detention of 200 
lawyers and activists.423 The petition denounces the “intimidating 
harassment” of authorities against lawyers.424 The petition calls on 
the Chinese government to “respect the constitutional rights” of 
the detained lawyers, as well as an end to the raids on law offices 
and a fair and transparent judicial process for the detained 
lawyers.425 The petition, which was signed by over 1,000 people, 
states that “[o]nly when lawyers’ professional duty and rights are 
respected can the rule of law as understood in the civilised world 
take root in Mainland China,”426 Within China, only in Hong Kong 
could such a petition drive take root and grow. But for all of the 
economic benefits that have inured to China from the return of 
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Hong Kong, the social upheaval wrought by the island’s 
long-British-ruled inhabitants may cost the Party dearly. 
The American social upheaval of the 1960s, topped off by 
Watergate in the early 1970s, produces a generation of lawyers 
who were far more devoted to social justice than their 
predecessors.427 Along with Ford Foundation funding,428 the 
greatest impetus for the development of law school clinical 
programs focused on social justice was student demand.429 The 
clinical legal education movement has begun in China during the 
last decade, and appears connected with heightened levels of 
student interest in social justice.430 Like their American cause 
lawyer counterparts of fifty to seventy years ago, the new breed of 
die-hard lawyer may be marking a way forward for their legal 
profession. 
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In two remarkable ways, the Die-Hard lawyer and the U.S. 
civil rights lawyer are cut from the same cloth. First, both groups 
have been persecuted for challenging deeply-entrenched social 
order and power structures. And second, both groups have offended 
traditional professional norms of behavior, engendering the 
approbation from professional and state officials. 
The current mood of the possibility of legal change by cause 
lawyer is grim. Although there has surely been an increase in the 
number of human rights-oriented lawyers in China since 2012, and 
even since the 709 Crackdown, there is evidence that the 
ramped-up suppression and harassment by the state is wearing 
down the resolve of long-time activist lawyers. On a recent 
proposal to limit the number of times a non-Beijing licensed car 
may enter Beijing,431 a lawyer commented on his social media that, 
“if this policy came out 9 years ago, I might organize meetings, 
write ‘public interest petitions,’ and call for constitutionality and 
legality review; 6 years ago, I might write articles, receive 
interviews, and propose suggestions; 3 years ago, I might grumble 
a little; now, I only want to watch them silently.”432 
Despite these striking similarities, the two groups exist in 
powerfully different legal environments. By law, the Chinese 
lawyer’s number one professional duty is to the state, while the US 
lawyer’s independence from state influence is legendary.433 
Further, for the US civil rights lawyer, the highest authority, often 
belatedly, supported the lawyer’s reform work.434 The federal 
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courts and to some extent the executive branch stepped in at 
crucial junctures to thwart the repressive state and local regimes. 
There will be no such support from higher authority in China.  
In the end, the spirit of reform and justice-seeking connects 
the US civil rights lawyer with the Chinese Die-Hard lawyer. But 
the surrounding legal structures make the mission of the of the 
Die-Hard lawyer far more daunting than that of his US 
counterpart.435 The challenges faced by US civil rights lawyers 
were stiff. And without question, the US civil rights struggle 
persists today and many injustices remain. Indeed, during the 
presidency of Donald Trump, civil rights are under renewed and 
vigorous attacks.436 Lawyers, in the spirit of their 1940s–70s 
forerunners, have fought back and played significant roles in 
resisting these renewed attacks. Importantly, because of the work 
of their forerunners, US lawyers today can use the aggressive 
methods and represent causes with little or no professional or legal 
consequences. As difficult and at times seemingly hopeless was the 
US civil rights lawyer’s mission, and as much as that mission 
continues some seventy years after it began in earnest, the mission 
of the Chinese Die-Hard lawyer is infinitely more difficult.437  
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